

JPRS-UMA-86-004

16 January 1986

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LEAD EDITORIAL: 'CLOSENESS TO PEOPLE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 85 (Signed to press 19 Sept 85) p 3-8

[Text] The regiment had fallen behind at one time. Certain subunits were plagued by infractions of discipline, and there were disruptions in the training. The regiment is now rightly considered to be one of the best in the Ural Military District. The personnel successfully fulfill their combat and political training plans and the socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress and are improving the qualitative indices for the field training. Firm regulation order is maintained in the unit and there is an atmosphere of harmonious work, comradely mutual assistance and intolerance of negligence, irresponsibility and disorder.

These changes occurred when Lieutenant Colonel V. Krivulkin, the new commander, arrived in the artillery regiment. Working with his deputies and relying upon help from the party organization, he succeeded in changing the situation in the large collective within a relatively short period of time. The fact that the officer has a highly developed sense of responsibility and a strong will and is a capable organizer and indoctrinator unquestionably had an effect. The fact that he immediately gained the good feeling of the men and was able to unite and lead them also played a large role.

Being close to subordinates increases the commander's abilities and imparts particular effectiveness to his organizational work, his professional competence and demandingness. In the words of V.I. Lenin, a leader has the ability to draw people, he knows their moods, he understands the common people, he is able to gain their absolute trust, and he always achieves success in the area assigned to him. This applies equally to the work of the commander and the political worker, the staff and directorate officer.

Every job is organized by man. And the more difficult the job and the more responsibility it involves, the greater must be the awareness, the political and labor activeness of the people performing it.

The April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee advanced tasks for accelerating the society's social and economic development on the basis of scientific and technological progress. It named the following as one of the absolute conditions for their successful accomplishment: "...in the first

place, stimulate the human factor and see to it that every individual works conscientiously and at full capacity at his station." The plenum stressed with new force the need to give maximum attention to everything pertaining to the individual, to his work, his material well-being, his rest and relaxation.

Requirements with respect to the combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy, to their organization and discipline have increased considerably in the contemporary, tense international situation, in the situation of the increased military threat from imperialism. Commanders, political organs and party organizations attempt to organize all of their work with this in mind, in accordance with the spirit of the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and with its directives, and with Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's address in Minsk to directing personnel of the Armed Forces.

In the organizational and indoctrinational work the stress is on further strengthening the officers' vital ties with the fightingmen, on supporting and developing their creative initiative, on creating for the personnel all of the conditions necessary for productive training, a normal life and good leisure-time activities. All of this in combination with demandingness and increased control and verification of performance is producing perceptible results in many units and on many ships with respect to strengthening military discipline and regulation order and to improving combat readiness.

Close ties with the masses, closeness to and concern for the people constitute an extremely important feature of the Leninist style of leadership. It is produced by the socialist social system, by the very nature of our common popular Armed Forces. Soviet officers regard it as the key to thoroughly understanding their subordinates and therefore, the key to more effective training and indoctrination of the fightingmen.

The Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR require that the commander and chief "thoroughly study the personnel through personal contact with them both in the service and in their personal lives." Precisely through personal contact, because it is not easy to get to know the individual and his inner world. At the very least, this requires the ability to gain the individual's good feeling and find the way to get close to him. Those commanders and political workers who constantly communicate with the soldiers and NCO's, sailors and petty officers in a relaxed atmosphere, not just as a matter of duty but mainly because of a spiritual need, have a good influence on the thoughts, the feelings and actions of the fightingmen, on all of their service and in the final analysis, on the state of military discipline and the effectiveness of the combat training.

The workstyle of Lieutenant Colonel A. Yasnitskiy, commander of an excellent communications regiment; Lieutenant Colonel I. Arnaut, commander of an outstanding motorized rifle battalion; Captain Lieutenant S. Vedernikov, deputy commander for political affairs on a submarine; and Captain G. Syromyatnikov, deputy commander for political affairs of a tank battalion, is exemplary in this respect. Not a day goes by when these leaders do not have heartfelt

communication with the fightingmen and respond with sensitivity to their feelings, needs and requests, and they never alienate or hurt a subordinate by speaking rudely to him. They always know why a certain soldier or sailor has suddenly relaxed his efforts in the service or whose home has been struck by disaster, for example, who has stopped receiving letters from the girl he loves, who has squabbled with a comrade over some trifling matter or has offended a colleague in a fit of anger.... And they promptly take steps, helping one, encouraging another, taking a third in hand. As a result a wholesome moral climate is maintained in the military collectives headed by these officers, and there are no undesirable occurrences with respect to discipline.

We have many tested methods of studying the fightingmen, their feelings, needs and requests. They include thoroughly getting to know newly arrived subordinates, individual talks, the questioning of the personnel as specified by regulations, seeing servicemen on personal matters, getting to know the individual in the process of the combat and political training itself and in the process of public work, as well as from opinions voiced by colleagues on the individual at Komsomol meetings and general personnel meetings.... The most important thing is the extent to which these are used systematically and deliberately and how thoroughly the officer has mastered the art of individual work and is able to gain the confidence of his subordinates.

Closeness to the men produces good results when it is inspired with party-mindedness, earnest responsiveness, devotion to the military service, personal moral irreproachability on the part of the leader and a sincere desire to help the individual become better and purer, to rid himself of defects of character and flaws in his conduct. It in no way precludes--on the contrary, it requires--principle, demandingness and the resolute prevention of everything detrimental to combat readiness and discipline, everything contrary to our communist moral standards.

Being close to subordinates for an officer has nothing to do with being easy on them, with familiarity, permissiveness or ingratiating. That fine line which separates the one from the other must be perceived very keenly.

However, we sometimes still have cases in which the leader himself is not distinguished by irreproachable conduct or zeal in the service, and he therefore excuses lack of discipline in his subordinates, closes his eyes to simplifications and indulgences in the training and deliberately makes the situation look better than it actually is. Officer Yu. Goman, among others, set out on this slippery path. He went so far with his "democratic principles" and "approachability" as to join his subordinates in drinking alcohol.

Such breakdowns in morality ordinarily begin with small things. Certain officers, most frequently young ones, deviate from the regulation standards for relations in an attempt to gain the collective's trust as rapidly as possible. During duty hours they address subordinates not by rank and last name, but by first name, resort to the use of "spicy" language, are not adverse to listening with the others to a joke by some vulgar wit and engage in inflating scores in drills and exercises. This harmful approach sometimes creates the appearance of mutual understanding at first, and the officer appears unpretentious

and approachable in the eyes of the soldiers and NCO's. Sooner or later, however, relations built on the shifting sand of familiarity inevitably have bitter consequences. In order to avoid this kind of damage, in their work with the young officers the senior chiefs, the party and Komsomol organizations should caution them in good time against taking the wrong step and patiently teach them to treat the men with consideration and demandingness. It is also important to explain the inadmissability of going to the other extreme, in which certain subunit commanders behave like unapproachable chiefs and barricade themselves from subordinates with a wall of purely official relations, erroneously assuming that the more distance there is between them and the soldiers and sailors, the more authoritative they will appear in the eyes of the latter.

It is not just the young officers who fall into this delusion, however, but even those who have served long enough and should have acquired experience. Some of them have come to believe in the miraculous force of administrative power as the only means of organizing affairs in their section of the work and consider it enough to attend formations and drills and to address service conferences and sometimes party and Komsomol meetings. Even if such an officer stops by a barracks or seamen's quarters, he only does so to inspect and not to speak candidly with the men, and he equates demandingness with crudeness and yelling.

This is the workstyle used by Major N. Ionov, commander of a communications and electronics battalion, among others. He has already been brought to party accountability for rudeness and for humiliating subordinates. The officer-and-communist did not draw any conclusions, however. His administrative arrogance and moral deafness have prevented him from taking a self-critical look at himself, from hearing the echo of his own actions, from seeing their unpleasant consequences and understanding the spirit and demands of the times. Complaints about him continue to arrive at various levels. Commissions have checked out the reports and have stated over and over again that Major Ionov is permitting infractions of regulations governing relations among servicemen. The senior chiefs limit themselves to half-measures, however.

Arrogance, rudeness and spiritual callousness toward people are absolutely contrary to our socialist way of life. They are in glaring conflict with the demands of the party, the Constitution of the USSR, Soviet laws and military regulations.

It is especially intolerable when certain political workers set out on a path of openly bureaucratic functioning. And we still have cases of this. It goes without saying that the deputy commander for political affairs of the subunit, the unit or ship, like any chief, is vested with authority to issue instructions, to make assignments and demand that they be carried out. All of this notwithstanding, however, the method of persuasion and the ability to talk to the soldier's heart have been, are and always will be his main work method. Writer S. Smirnov has written some precise words on this matter: "Just as a musician is inconceivable without acute hearing, just as it is impossible to be an artist without a particularly fine perception of colors, one cannot be

a party or political worker without intense friendly and heartfelt interest in people, in their thoughts and feelings, in their dreams and desires."

The political worker is expected to give the officers lessons in the complex science of human understanding with his closeness to and respect for the fightingmen, his party fervor and honor, his sensitivity for the dignity of others and his rigid moral self-control. And the fact that such lessons are essential is borne out by instances in which individual officers become isolated from the personnel, which is frequently one of the causes of infractions of military discipline. What is alarming is the fact that certain comrades have not completely grasped the essence of vital ties with subordinates. They are sincerely puzzled: How is it possible to be isolated, they reason, when one spends the entire day with the soldiers and NCO's in training? However, and this is confirmed by numerous facts, one can be alongside a certain fightingmen and not know what is troubling or depressing him; one can be in the unit or on the ship and not know about life in the barracks or quarters at a given time, not sense the psychological factors in relations among the personnel which make it possible to assess the collective's moral strength.

There is a time-tested method of developing in the officers the need and the ability to be close to the men, to live in the thick of the soldiers' life, to know it inside out, to know the feelings, the requests and needs of subordinates and to respond sensitively to them. It is the personal example set by senior chiefs in the fulfillment of Lenin's precepts and party directives and in being close to the men. When the commander or the chief of the political section of the unit or formation and higher-ranking leaders reach the rank and file of soldiers and sailors and the individual when visiting the sites, when they engage in vital and relaxed talks with the men, speak with them in the language of truth without avoiding sensitive issues, when they react seriously to requests and desires and resolve pressing problems, the officers at the level of the regiment or the ship ordinarily emulate them. And when the senior chiefs also inquire as to whether the specific subunit commander or staff officer frequently meets with subordinates in a relaxed atmosphere and addresses them on political subjects, and how he reacts to complaints and suggestions from the fightingmen, those who have no answer later make adjustments in their workstyle.

Participation by the communists in charge in the ideological and the mass political work has increased markedly in the army and navy since the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Staff and directorate party organizations have started issuing more frequent assignments to the officers-and-communists working in the units and on the ships to present lectures and reports and to conduct talks and then to hear reports on the completion of the party assignments. The common political days and evenings of questions and answers are a good method of involving staff officers in the indoctrinational process.

A study has shown, however, that there are still numerous unutilized reserves and possibilities in this area. Some staff communists still do not willingly engage in individual work. Furthermore, there are instances in which some of them limit their contacts with the personnel mainly to addressing them from

the speaker's platform. This is clearly a long way from real contact with the personnel, and the party organizations need to react to cases of this.

Political organs and primary party organizations have an exceptionally great role in involving all of the communists, particularly the communists in charge, in daily and focused work with the servicemen. The CPSU Charter and Leninist standards of internal party life require that party members be in close touch with the people. "Constant and vital contact with the workers, the peasants, the intelligentsia and the youth is the main point of party work," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev stressed when he addressed metallurgists in Dnepropetrovsk.

In the military collectives in which CPSU members and candidate members conscientiously fulfill the party's demands, in which they are close and attentive to the fightingmen and with their deeds have gained recognition by the latter as the political vanguard, they have a great influence upon the minds, the service, the training and the discipline of the personnel. This is the situation, as an example, in party organizations of the Motorized Rifle Proskurov Regiment, the Guards Tank Shepetovka Regiment and many other outstanding units and ships.

But do all of the party members of subunits, units and ships have such solid ties with the fightingmen everywhere? Unfortunately, not all of them and not everywhere. Communication with the men based on trust, concern for them and active participation in the ideological and the mass political work have not yet become a spiritual need, a compelling matter for certain communists. In party organizations of the motorized rifle regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Timashkov serves and the air regiment in which Major M. Atroshchenko is chief of the political section, for example, certain party members avoid vital work with the fightingmen, because they themselves have come to a halt in their ideological growth, they do not shine in the combat training and they violate discipline, while others simply do not want to trouble themselves with the extra work. The regimental party committees are not properly demanding of the communists. As a result, party influence upon the combat and political training and the strengthening of discipline has weakened there.

In certain party organizations the secretaries and members of the party committees and bureaus do not set a personal example in being close to the men and they involve themselves excessively with meetings and conferences and with drawing up numerous plans. The situation is sometimes so bad that certain fightingmen who do not belong to the party do not know who heads the party organization of the unit or the ship. What kind of vital linkage can the party activists have with the personnel in this situation? I believe that the communists will assess such facts from a standpoint of principle at the forthcoming report-and-election party meetings and outline ways to strengthen their links with the masses of fightingmen.

Primary Komsomol organizations of the army and navy work in the very thick of the soldiers' and sailors' life. Their activists constantly live and serve side by side, as they say, with the fightingmen. They therefore have extensive opportunities to make a contribution to the unifying of the military

collectives, the establishment of friendship and comradeship in them and the prevention of drunkenness, nonregulation relations, cases of being AWOL from the unit and other infractions of discipline. Many activists make skillful use of these. There are others, however, who do not see the individual behind the profusion of activities. Furthermore, certain members of the Komsomol committees and bureaus look with indifference upon violations of regulations and our moral standards by the fightingmen-and-Komsomol members. This indicates that party supervision of the Komsomol collectives must be improved.

Many years of experience has shown that the closer commanders, political workers, staff and directorate officers, party and Komsomol activists are to the men, the more conscientiously work the fightingmen and the more successfully are accomplished the tasks involved in the combat and political training and the strengthening of military discipline. This is an important time in the army and navy. In the summing-up inspections the fightingmen will have to report with action on their preparedness to defend the homeland and demonstrate what kind of results in their military work they are taking with them toward the 27th CPSU Congress. During this period it is particularly important to reach every individual, to exert a political influence upon every soldier and NCO, every sailor and petty officer, every seagoing and shore-based warrant officer and every officer, to do everything possible to see that the combat readiness is raised to a new and higher level and that the socialist commitments are absolutely and completely fulfilled.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

'WESTERN MILITARISM', CURRENT ROLES OF SOCIALIST ARMED FORCES

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 85 pp 24-27

[Political Training editorial: "Our Duty Is To Strengthen Combat Effectiveness"]

[Text] A person who forgets about the constant danger that threatens us, a danger that will not stop while world imperialism exists, is a person who will forget about our Labor Republic.

V. I. Lenin

The new 1985/86 training year in the political training system for Army and Navy warrant officers and extended-service soldiers is opening with the theme "The Military-Political Situation In The World And Tasks For Personnel In Preparing For The 27th CPSU Congress." This theme was called upon to help students more thoroughly understand several tendencies in the contemporary military-political situation, the reasons and sources for the increased military danger and the aggressive imperialist forces' increased preparations for a new nuclear missile war using space-based equipment. Another reason was the urgent need for strengthening the country's defensive ability and for increasing the vigilance and military preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Four hours, two lecture and two seminar, are allotted for mastering this theme and it is advisable to concentrate primarily on the following issues during the exercise:

1. Several tendencies in the contemporary military-political situation.
2. The militarization of bourgeois society -- a threat to peace.
3. Preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress and tasks for the Soviet Armed Forces.

The contemporary level of world development is marked by a further exacerbation of the epoch's primary contradiction -- the difference between socialism and capitalism. Two contradicting trends, the course toward preserving peace and the course toward preparing for a new war, have become more apparent then ever before in the international arena. There is one issue that has become vividly apparent under the current difficult conditions: will progressive forces succeed in averting mankind's fall toward nuclear war? Its

ominous shade, arising from the aggressive wings of imperialism, is so great that it has to be considered. Therefore the CPSU made its wise appeal that was directed at the peoples of all continents: do everything possible to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to preserve peace on our planet. This expresses the profound essence of the Soviet Peace Program, As was stressed at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "The Soviet Union has time and time again declared that it will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence which is defined by our social structure, our morals and our world outlook."

The world socialist system, whose actions stem from the Leninist principle "Peace will advance things in an endless quality, much better than war," is the primary force that opposes imperialism's new militaristic onslaught. It is not difficult to imagine what it would be like if the socialist system, the main bastion of peace and the motivating force for progress in the modern era, had not been astride the path of imperialism, which has already created two world wars and dozens of local wars in the 20th Century alone. Today imperialism is not free to bind people to its will or dictate its political conditions to them. Nor can it export counterrevolution with impunity. The world socialist system has enough material and spiritual strength to spoil the intrigues of any aggressors.

In evaluating the military-political situation in the world, the CPSU first of all considers real socialism's ability to defend the security of people. This is the most important principle in the analysis and scientific approach to understanding the events of international life. Only the socialist fraternity, which possesses a reliable potential for defense, can prevent world imperialism's claims to world supremacy. It is impossible to correctly evaluate the new phenomena in the contemporary military-political situation without considering this conclusion.

And there is yet another aspect to this contradiction of the epoch -- the world of capital. Constant crisis phenomena and numerous social ills are inherent in the world of capital and the differences among capitalist states continue to worsen. As earlier, the intra-imperialist differences within NATO and among the various other state grouping within this world are sharp. It is constantly shaken by intense manifestations of social, economic, financial, raw material and energy crises and the difficulties which capitalism is experiencing affect both its foreign and domestic policies. As before, the ruling elements in a number of imperialist states see anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and the arms race as the primary way out of these difficulties, for these shift the center of attention from internal problems to external ones. This bellicose, militaristic course is also making a deep impression on the entire military-political situation in the world and by analyzing it, one can detect a number of tendencies which sort of create the internal structure of many international processes.

The first tendency is expressed by increased aggression on the part of contemporary imperialism, and especially the US. In a speech to a solemn Kremlin gathering dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev stressed, "American militarism in on the front lines of the

military threat to mankind. U.S. policies are taking on an ever increasing bellicose nature and have become a real negative factor in international relations, a factor that must be taken into account." And the concept of "US world leadership", which tries to claim the role of the decider of the fate of the planet's peoples, has again been dragged out into the open. Resorting to the traditional fantasy about the "Soviet military threat" as the primary theoretical "foundation" of its adventurist policy, the leaders of the present U.S. administration are continuing their open course toward achieving military superiority over the USSR.

What has caused this turn-about in imperialist policy? In addition to the social-economic reasons that were given above, the course toward confrontation to a large degree is explained by the class reaction to detente. The brain centers of imperialism's ruling circles have counted on the fact that, as the known anti-Soviet Z. Brzezinski sadly expressed, "semi-detente" is better for them than is a "semi-cold war." In addition to the purely military aspects, the course toward superiority that the US and its partners have selected must, in their opinion, draw the Soviet Union and the other states in the socialist community into an expensive arms race and cause economic, social and other types of difficulties within the socialist system. But all of these calculations are unrealistic. The Soviet Government will not allow the strategic military equality between the USSR and the US and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, an equality that is an exceptionally important achievement for the socialist world, to be disrupted. The April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted, "In the future we will spare no efforts so that the Armed Forces of the USSR will have everything that they need for the defense of our Fatherland and its allies and so that no one will be able to catch us unaware." Not a single challenge threatening the security of the socialist countries will remain unanswered.

The second tendency is reflected in the aspirations of American imperialism to gain a unilateral military advantage at any cost. This has been extensively manifested in numerous military programs that are being quickly realized. We are detecting a number of characteristic features to support this. The US is shifting its center of attention in the arms race further and further toward the qualitative side and toward the development of new means of armed conflict. The US has already developed the neutron bomb, multiple-reentry space vehicles for military purposes, long-range cruise missile and others. Enormous sums have been thrown into the development of extremely accurate weapons which have an effect very similar to nuclear weapons and based on these, models of "air-to-ground operations" which envision the destruction of the enemy to an extreme depth, are being developed. Work is going on at full steam toward the development of weapons based on new physical principles such as lasers, beams and so forth.

American leadership also plans to attempt a major violation of the established strategic balance of forces by extensively militarizing space. The American administration has already made the first steps toward realizing those plans. In March 1983 President Reagan published the program creating anti-missile defenses in space. Despite contrived attempts to depict the "Star Wars Program" as defensive, it has an obvious offensive character. If the militaristic forces of American imperialism succeed, let's

say, in developing such a system in the 90's, thus making the US to some degree safe from a retaliatory strike, then, because of their adventurism, they could choose a more opportune moment for making a nuclear missile attack on the socialist community. And we must not forget that military space stations can be used extensively against the opposite side's space equipment and also against land targets. In essence, the U.S. militaristic space program is a continuance of its search for new weapons for gaining victory in a nuclear war.

While working toward qualitative superiority in the arms race, the United States has also not weakened its attention on the quantitative aspect. U.S. imperialism has set out to realize the most extensive weapons programs in the entire history of mankind, intending to achieve military superiority over the USSR and its allies.

The third tendency of the contemporary military-political situation reflects the fact that many explosive points on our planet are being retained. As a rule, these are locations where the contradiction of forces between reaction and progress, imperialism and socialism, are being forced. As a consequence of the global aggressive policy of imperialism and its accomplices, the level of military tension is being maintained in the Near East, South Africa, in Central America, in South-East and South Asia, in the Persian Gulf region, the Horn of Africa and in several other areas of the earth. The undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is continuing and the threat of direct U.S. military intervention hangs over the heroic people of Nicaragua.

Strengthening the independence of liberated countries does not suit the imperialist forces. Today Washington is openly interfering in their internal affairs while trying to bind these governments to itself. Brazenly declaring entire continents as "zones of vital interests" for the US, American militarists are attempting in this way to give themselves the right of open expansion, thus exerting military pressure on progressive regimes. In this same vein, the line toward achieving military superiority over the USSR and its allies is being realized through pressuring progressive forces in developing countries and limiting the influence of socialist countries in these countries. The USSR's course toward strengthening cooperation in liberated countries and with the national liberation movements is explained as complicity towards "terrorism" and the "exportation of revolution." Based on these lies and on sinister doctrinal arrangements, imperialists are doing everything they can to promote the exaggeration of conflicts and the appearance of hot-points of new local wars. And they are attempting to gain from this. For example, imperialism is attempting to use the Iran-Iraq conflict to strengthen its own influence in that area.

We must also not forget that potential hotbeds of tension and the present local wars are more than just definite epicenters of the global contradiction between the two systems. Under certain circumstances these could also become detonators for enormous wars. Therefore, an analysis of the military-political situation in the world today must not be limited to mutual relations between the major powers alone, but must consider the specific situation in the various regions of the planet.

We have examined only a few tendencies in the contemporary military-political situation. Of course, there are others, such as the increased opposition on the part of European peoples to U.S. nuclear plans; the increase in the military activity of NATO agencies in both the operational and tactical arenas; the "politization" of several areas and their use toward military-political goals and others. Their entirety gives a total picture of the situation in the world. Naturally, the real picture of the military-political situation can be given only after a thorough consideration of the decisive factor in modern social development -- the world socialist system. This analysis can be amplified with political evaluations associated with the increased militarization of bourgeois societies.

The continuing and accelerating process of militarization in imperialist states is having a negative affect on the military-political situation in the world. This is primarily reflected in the unprecedented growth of their military budgets which reached almost 300 billion dollars in the United States this year. However, this is in no way the limit of the Pentagon's demands. The present administration is now taking every measure to even further increase the already astronomical sum of military expenditures. In essence, the U.S. military budget looks like a steeple that is being built over the flat plane of other programs. Thus the material base for war is swiftly increasing and militarism, which in the words of V. I. Lenin is a "vital manifestation" of capitalism, is its primary working mechanism. This is not just the militarization of states, but the total subordination, albeit covered by bourgeois-democratic dressing, of the economic, political and spiritual life of the country to the needs of the military machine and to the primary instrument of imperialist policy which is constantly complicating the military-political situation in the world.

The bourgeoisie cannot guarantee their supremacy without relying on military forces and therefore militarism is inherent not only in imperialist giants, but also in the medium and small capitalist countries, although to varying degrees. Militarism results from the very exploitative nature of bourgeois society and, as V. I. Lenin noted, exists in all capitalist countries, even in those that appear neutral. It is one of imperialism's basic social properties.

The foreign policy of imperialist states, a policy that impacts on the world's military-political situation, springs entirely from the needs of the militaristic circles which are specifically doing everything possible to solidify the bonds of "Atlantic solidarity" and to inspire new ideas into imperialist doctrine. The so-called "partnership" is getting special emphasis. If one were to remove the camouflage of general phrases, one would find that behind the terminology is the primary capitalist power's desire to transfer as much of the expense load as possible to its allies and to increase their "contribution" to the aggressive plans of the US. However, it is becoming harder and harder for the American leadership to accomplish this. There is an increased number of simple people on the European continent who understand that by turning Europe into a nuclear arsenal, the US is actually making it a hostage in the event of war. There has been an increase in the solidarity of peace-loving forces and in the activity of anti-war, anti-

nuclear movements and therefore, when analyzing militarism's effect on the foreign policy of imperialist states, it is important to see not only that they are following the US lead, but also that there are deep, latent processes reflecting the popular protest and contradiction that exist within imperialism and that objectively reflect anti-militarist tendencies.

Militarism is also stimulating the appearance and functioning of various reactionary, military bureaucratic regimes which are fruitlessly suppressing progressive movements. The negative consequences of militarism's effect on social processes in developing countries is partially explained by the fact that the army is often the only influential, organizing force in these countries. The nature of the change that is accomplished in one country or another often depends on the social-political orientation of military leaders. Of course, the more organization and influence that progressive forces, communist and workers parties, professional unions and workers as a whole have in these countries, the more difficult it is for militaristic forces to force their will on the liberated states.

Bourgeois states and especially the US have military treaty relationships with many of these countries. The agreements make the US "obligated" to defend the "sovereignty and independence" of the developing countries. Thus, in supporting its ally ties with several dozen countries, ties that were confirmed in accordance with legal documents, the United States of America plans its own military program and considers the "necessity of the armed defense" of these countries against the "Red Danger." Historical experience says that such a "defense" is in fact imperialist interference. Thus militaristic forces proceed from concepts of a neocolonial world outlook and as a rule support the most reactionary military dictators without sparing any forces and means to suppress progressive regimes. This in turn complicates the situation in one region or another and creates local hotbeds of tension.

Militarism also permeates the policy of capitalist countries in their relationship with the socialist world. The craving to resolve the historical argument between the two social systems by military means is clearly seen in the foreign political course of imperialism's most aggressive circles. The military parity (equality) that has developed (and been acknowledged in both the capitalist and socialist world) between the two systems has most often been construed as a "threat" and a dangerous challenge to the "free world." The principle of equal security, without which peaceful coexistence is unthinkable, is being seen as "beneficial" to the Soviet Union without there is no basis for this.

Militaristic propaganda, which for many years has speculated on a very evil and hypocritical myth which is only a that, a myth about the "Soviet military threat", could significantly move the consciousness of many people to the right and revive the "longing" for America's former world leadership. As a result of the unprecedented anti-communist cultivation of the population of the United States, American sociologist S. Talbott notes in his book "Russia and Reagan" that, "The majority of the American people believe in the statements by governmental leaders about the enormous threat coming out of Moscow." Whereas in the 70's statements by U.S. political leaders frequently contained assertions about "strategic balance", an "established balance of

military forces" "the inconceivability of nuclear war", the tone and words now are entirely different.

Washington has made it clear that such essential issues in international relations as negotiations on strategic arms limitation and measures to reduce the threat of military confrontation are not of primary concern in U.S. foreign policy planning. The present American leadership, one which was elevated to the summit of power by military circles, looks at the world primarily from a point of view of American-Soviet hostility. The logic of this position is simple. Any point on the planet, any international problem and any event is first and foremost an arena for a fight with the Soviet Union. The US has planned to use every weapon and means for hostility to do this and they are doing it. V. I. Lenin was certainly correct when as long ago as 1920 he talked about American "jingoism" which personifies extreme, bellicose militarism and which is a major danger for socialism.

Today the most bellicose, jingoistic wing of the most reactionary part of American bourgeoisie have gained power over the more moderate representatives of monopolistic capital and this represents an increased military danger to the world and to socialism. The American administration, which primarily reflects the interests of the military-industrial complex, is concentrating all of its attention on the art of preparing for war and not on the art of maintaining peace. For the very reactionary, militaristic circles, nuclear war is not the very worst thing on earth, but is instead allowable and possible. Thus the leaders on the hill of power in Washington are still thinking jingoistically. And if, in the future, their methodology of thinking should conform to their methodology of acting, the military-political situation will be further heated. This is fraught with severe consequences for the world.

Soviet Armed Forces play an important role in restraining the imperialist war machine under the present difficult international situation. Personnel in the Army and Navy are reliably guarding the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people. Because of the major political up-swing in our country, one that was brought about by decisions of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the active preparations for the 27th CPSU Party Congress, Soviet soldiers are fully resolved to raise Armed Forces military preparedness even higher and to persistently improve their military skills.

Socialist competition which was initiated under the banner "The 40th Anniversary Of Great Victory, The 27th CPSU Congress -- Our Selfless Military Duty" is gathering more and more force. Struggling to complete their socialist commitments, personnel in the Army and Navy are focusing their primary efforts on resolving the tasks of supporting vigilance and combat readiness, increasing their qualitative indicators in resolving combat readiness tasks and mastering weapons and military equipment in a shorter time. Communists and Komsomol members are in the forefront of the struggle for high marks in military training. The total completion of socialist commitments that were accepted for 1985 must be considered the most important tasks for every soldier, subunit, unit, and ship and must be considered their contribution to a worthy meeting for the congress.

Numerous detachments of Army and Navy warrant officers, reliable assistants for officers in training and educating privates and sergeants, are actively taking part in the above-mentioned competition along with all soldiers. Thoroughly understanding their responsibility for the defense of the Fatherland and for increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the majority of them are serving as an example in meeting their military duty and their functional responsibilities. They are constantly increasing their military qualifications to be at the level of contemporary requirements, are passing their accumulated knowledge and experience to their subordinates, and are struggling to strengthen discipline and support regulatory order and organization in subunits, units and on ships. Along with the officers, Army and Navy warrant officers are striving to unconditionally fulfill their training plans and programs, are using every minute of training time efficiently and are not allowing simplifications and indulgences. They are showing special concern in this area so that every soldier skillfully masters the equipment and weapons entrusted to them and maintains them in a constant state of readiness for effective combat use, is able to destroy targets at maximum ranges with the first shot, first volley or first strike, day or night. The Army and Navy warrant officers who have been entrusted to safeguard weapons, ammunition, fuel and lubricants and other military property play a special role in maintaining combat readiness. There are warrant officers in every unit and on every ship who are at the forefront of socialist competition in honor of the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress.

Maintaining the military preparedness of the Army and Navy at a level that meets the demands of the contemporary military-political situation will allow the Soviet Armed Forces to guarantee the future completion of its historical role -- guaranteeing the defense of peace and socialism, which means the defense of the present and future millions of peoples. The Armed Forces are carrying out this missions and are solving a number of closely interrelated military missions.

One of the primary directions for carrying out the Armed Forces' social role is reliably guaranteeing the security of the multinational socialist state, the creation of foreign conditions that are favorable for the peaceful, constructive labor of our people and the successful accomplishment of the tasks that the party has planned for improving the development of socialist society. The Soviet Army and Navy's readiness to repulse aggression is creating a very important, positive moment in the military-political situation. During peace, this mission is resolved by maintaining constant military preparedness to repulse any possible aggressor attack and to resolutely stop provocational acts by any militaristic force. The operational readiness of the various subunits and every soldier's effort to keep the Armed Forces at a high state of combat readiness, duties that epitomize the functions of defending the Socialist Fatherland in peacetime, are taking on special importance now. In the event there is a military attack on our country, the Army will undertake the armed defense of the Fatherland as an unconditionally just war and this in and of itself will give the Armed Forces an enormous moral-psychological advantage over any aggressor.

Since the formations of the world socialist system, the Armed Forces have acquired and are developing the important function of working along with fraternal armies to guarantee the security of the entire community. The accomplishment of this important political mission relies on the international solidarity of all people in the socialist countries. The experience of the post-war decades has convincingly confirmed the correctness of the decision to create the socialist military-political union, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, on 14 May, 1955. This organization has effectively combined and coordinated the efforts of fraternal countries in providing a collective defense for more than 30 years. The presence of the military-political union of European socialist countries has been a powerful, stabilizing factor in Europe and in the whole world. The 26 April 1985 Warsaw signing of the Protocol to extend the time that the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid is in effect is a clear demonstration of resolve on the part of socialist states to strengthen their unity and solidarity in the future, to jointly defend revolutionary accomplishments and to fight for peace on the planet.

The Army of the Soviet State is a powerful revolutionary entity by dint of its social nature. The defense of the Socialist Fatherland is closely linked with providing the appropriate political form of international assistance to the national liberation movements, progressive regimes and young states that are fighting against imperialist dominance. This is not "exporting revolution", as enemies of socialism and progress and opportunists of every stripe love to accuse us of. This assistance is primarily expressed by using political means to restrain imperialism's aggressive feeble impulse and, in a number of cases, in training national military cadres, delivering military equipment and so forth. For example, assistance has been given to the people of Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, a number of Arab countries and other states -- victims of aggression.

And today Soviet soldiers are carrying out a responsible mission in the friendly country of Afghanistan, where at the request of the Afghan government the Soviet State provided international assistance in defending the achievements of the April revolution. Personnel from the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the DRA [the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] are serving courageously and selflessly under difficult conditions, as befitting the heirs of the glorious revolutionary and military traditions of our people.

The nature of the social role which the Soviet Armed Forces are meeting would not be complete if we did not stress that at the present time they are a powerful factor for the international security of people and a factor for averting a new world war.

Imperialism has started nearly 100 local wars and armed conflicts in the post-war period and more than once has brought peace to the dangerous edge of an enormous military conflagration. But after colliding with the might and resolve of the socialist system, imperialism was forced to withdraw. It is now more difficult for imperialism to operate "from a position of strength," inflict its will on people and start wars with impunity. The more and more powerful community of socialist countries and their armed forces are restraining the bellicose aspirations of militaristic circles. And the social

role which the army of the socialist states is now playing is especially apparent in this. Thus a very unique situation has developed. The army which has been an instrument of war throughout the history of class society is becoming an objective instrument for averting war under socialism and is one of the most important factors for maintaining peace and strengthening the security of people.

An analysis of the contemporary international situation and of the social role which the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of fraternal socialist countries are fulfilling shows that if it had not been for their powerful defensive union, imperialism would have long ago shifted from a policy of threatening and military pressure to direct aggressive acts against socialist, liberated and other independent states. It is for precisely this reason that the struggle between the two paths and two strategic concepts is so vividly apparent in the contemporary military-political situation. One of these paths, the socialist, sees the armed forces of its countries exclusively as a bulwark of peace, for restraining aggression. The other, imperialist path, sees its armed forces as a means for expansion, supremacy and hegemony. The struggle between these two concepts and the real political forces to a significant degree defines the military content of the epoch's primary contradiction which is placing its decisive imprint on the entire panorama of international events. The calculation of its new advances and tendencies and an evolution in the imperialistic, and most of all, American strategic arrangement is a necessary condition for maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces at a state of constant combat readiness, able to totally carry out its assigned tasks and meet the 27th Congress of our native Communist party in a worthy manner.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN NECHAYEV ON PARTY FUNCTIONS OF 'CONTROL, SUPERVISION'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 85 (Signed to press 19 Sept 85) pp 17-24

[Article by Lt Gen V. Nechayev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Verification of Execution is an Extremely Important Part of the Organizational Work"]

[Text] Our party and the entire nation are preparing to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner. The questions which are being put forward for discussion, questions of paramount importance, the nature of the period which we are living through and the novelty and scope of the tasks arising for the society are determining the importance of the congress and will make it a landmark in the national life.

Mobilizing the Soviet people to achieve qualitative advances in the economy, its transition to the path of intensive development and the all-around enhancement of production effectiveness, the party is orienting us toward a critical approach to what has been achieved and toward improvement of the organizational work in all areas. The April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee called for us to activate all unutilized reserves and particularly to stimulate the human factor and see to it that every individual performs his job conscientiously and at his full capacity.

Systematic control and verification of performance have been and remain a powerful means by which the party influences the course of social development and an inseparable part of the organizational work. All of the enormous experience in party, state, economic and military work has demonstrated that it is impossible to successfully implement party directives, to accomplish plans for the nation's economic and cultural development or to strengthen its defense capability without control and verification of performance. V.I. Lenin stated: "To monitor the people and verify the actual performance of the job--this, I repeat this and only this is now the crux of all the work, of all policy." Vladimir Ilich saw verification of performance as a means of combatting stagnation, complacency and superficiality in the work and of preventing infractions of party and state discipline.

The importance of verifying performance has become even greater at the contemporary stage in the building of the new society. The requirements have increased both with respect to the organization and implementation of control

and to the skills of those who perform it, to the style and methods used in this work. The April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed the fact that not a single party organization and not a single worker can be left without supervision.

Preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress are underway in the army and navy in a situation of realistic, critical assessment of what has been achieved and increased demandingness of the cadres. The political organs and party organizations are improving and increasing the effectiveness of control and verification of performance even more persistently.

Positive changes have occurred and are occurring in political organs and party organizations of the army and navy with respect to monitoring the fulfillment of enactments and directives from higher agencies, as well as their own decisions. A great deal is being done to implement the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Control and Verification of Performance in Light of Decisions Coming Out of the 26th CPSU Congress," as well as directives issued by plenums of the party Central Committee.

The fulfillment of decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee, orders issued by the USSR minister of defense and directives issued by the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is constantly monitored. The thorough study of processes occurring in the formations and units, on the ships and in the subunits, there where success with respect to combat readiness is determined, is becoming increasingly typical for organizing verification of performance. The most important matters having to do with providing a high level of combat readiness, strengthening military discipline and mastering the new equipment and weapons are ordinarily checked. Furthermore, not only is the state of affairs in specific military collectives thoroughly studied, but assistance is provided for the commanders, political workers and the party aktiv in the accomplishment of specific tasks. The results of the inspections are reported to a broad group of communists and are discussed in the political organs, at sessions of the party committees and party bureaus and at party meetings.

Consistent implementation of the course of increasing the role of control is also reflected in the fact that these matters are now being considered more frequently at meetings of the party aktiv, at scientific and practical conferences, at assemblies and at seminars of political workers and secretaries of party organizations. Special attention is given to the ability to thoroughly analyze the party work, to see what is important and what is secondary, to avoid the scattering of efforts and to make well-based summarizations and draw objective conclusions from the inspection results. We can see that it is a matter of taking a scientific approach to the organization of control as an absolute requirement for effectiveness.

The technology of control, if I may put it that way, is constantly being perfected. Comprehensive inspections of the work of party organizations are frequently made in the political organs in order to thoroughly study the fulfillment of party decisions, instructions from the military councils and superior

political organs and enactments of party conferences and meetings. Party organizations which perform in the most difficult circumstances or are the most typical for summarizing experience in the area under study are ordinarily designated for the comprehensive inspections in order to derive conclusions from their experience and provide recommendations of benefit to others. The work of outstanding collectives whose achievements can serve as a sort of reference point is also subjected to in-depth analysis. Inspections are also carried out in those units and on those ships which have not yet achieved high ratings. The purpose is to help the party organizations reveal unutilized reserves and to increase the responsibility of the communists for the state of affairs in their assigned areas.

Individual checks on the fulfillment of specific party decisions, orders issued by the command element and instructions from the political organ, a more operational form of control, are also frequently performed along with the comprehensive inspections. The principles involved in control are basically the same in this case, but they are applied on the basis of the specific circumstances, the volume of work and the periods of time set for its completion.

The success of both kinds of inspections depend upon the competence and experience of the inspectors, upon their preparation and their ability to objectively assess the state of affairs. Thorough preliminary work is performed before leaving for the sites, during which the key issues and the procedures and methods to be used in the inspection are defined, and documents and statistical data are studied.

The political organs and party committees are coordinating their activities increasingly more closely with staffs and directorates with respect to verifying the accomplishment of measures planned for the training period or for the current month. This prevents duplication and paralleling efforts in the work.

Much of what we have said is typical of the work of the political organ in which officer Yu. Shevchenko works. Regular, thoroughly prepared trips to the units are conducted there for purposes not just of checking to see how the implementation of party decisions is organized, but also for providing actual assistance in carrying out the guiding instructions and for summarizing positive experience. The combination of control, demandingness and assistance from the political organ is producing the desired results and helping to enhance party influence on the life and training of the fightingmen.

It would be incorrect to say that control and verification of performance have achieved perfection universally in the work of political organs and party organizations, however. The demands set forth at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee require us to perceive more keenly and resolutely eliminate remaining stereotypes and incorrect concepts and methods which have developed in the control praxis. And they still exist. This was borne out by a study of the entire system of control and execution. Far from always do the political organs and party organizations demonstrate concern for increasing the responsibility of the cadres for the fulfillment of what has

been planned, for indoctrinating them in a spirit of organization and efficiency or for the merging of control functions with direct organizational work. In some cases the inspections are carried out as a formality, and some checking officials conduct themselves like inspectors-general: They arrive with an enormous list of questions, give the documents a superficial look and make a big fuss but do not even attempt to define their role in the elimination of deficiencies or to help the communists.

The need for a constant, creative search for more effective forms and methods of control and for its improvement is dictated by the increased scale and complexity of the tasks being performed to further enhance the fighting efficiency of our Armed Forces. The performance discipline of cadres at all levels in the struggle for good combat readiness is extremely important in the present, drastically exacerbated international situation. And the political organs and party organizations are doing the right thing when they focus all of their organizational and political work on the unconditional implementation of the demands set by the CPSU Central Committee for the Armed Forces, on the accomplishment of tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for the combat improvement of the troops and naval forces and on the quality fulfillment of combat and political training plans for the current training year. Naturally, the political organs and party organizations seek and find their own approach and methods and use their inherent forms and methods for performing the control work.

In their work the political organs and party organizations attach paramount importance to the struggle to improve the quality and effectiveness of party-political work, to increase its influence on the accomplishment of the entire set of tasks having to do with combat readiness and to monitoring the effectiveness of this work in a situation approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree, particularly during the exercises and maneuvers, in the process of the field, air and naval training and the performance of alert duty. An important place is assigned to assuring that the communists take the avant-garde role in the combat training and the service.

The matter of strengthening order and discipline is urgent today as never before. It is particularly important under the circumstances of service in the army and navy. Without firm military discipline and regulation order we cannot count on success in teaching military skills to the fightingmen or on achieving good results in enhancing the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces. Control in this area is designed to help stimulate the work of assuring that the communists set a good example of military discipline.

Thoroughly improving party-political work to motivate the personnel to master the new weapons and equipment models is one of the important focuses of control and verification of performance. The political organs and party organizations work tirelessly to increase party influence with respect to improving the quality of exercises and drills, to see that all of the possibilities of socialist competition are utilized and that the experience of the outstanding men and best specialists is summarized and put to use, to improve the publicizing of technical military matters and to further develop rationalization and invention work in the units and on the ships.

While assuming supervision over the main directions of party-political work and indoctrination of the personnel, the political organs and party organizations struggle persistently to see that all of the tasks involved in enhancing combat readiness and firmly establishing strict regulation order are performed well. The extent of the personnel's combat training, the level of military discipline and organization and the state of the political and indoctrinational work constitute a precise and summary indicator of the practical work of commanders and political workers, of all the communists, and of the effectiveness of their efforts to verify performance.

Reality demands that we analyze the state of verification of performance most seriously and reveal and eliminate existing shortcomings in this area. Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, underscored at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "Verification is necessary and control is essential, and every check must be of practical benefit and serve the cause. Inspections of one and the same, sometimes petty, matter and numerous commissions set up out of formal considerations, taking people away from their work and creating a climate of anxiety, are hardly justified, however."

First of all, I would like to draw attention to how well verification of performance is organized and to its effectiveness. All of the energy in a verification of performance is frequently spent in the initial phase. Numerous commissions are set up, and various briefings are conducted for them. The verification process itself is left to proceed on its own, however. People study plans and reports in the units and on the ships and gather masses of facts and figures. Frequently, however, they do not properly interpret or thoroughly analyze this material, do not reveal the true causes of existing deficiencies and shortcomings and do not provide valuable, constructive recommendations. Because of this the results of the inspections are sometimes not comforting. Is this not what happened with representatives of a number of political organs who worked in the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division imeni M.I. Kalinin, for example? They repeatedly visited one of the regiments this year. The situation with respect to the quality of the combat training and the fulfillment of socialist commitments there is not what we would like it to be, however. This is due in great part to the fact that the inspectors merely recorded the successes and shortcomings disinterestedly. What was required--and this is far more difficult, of course--was the revelation of both positive and negative trends and mobilization of the personnel to achieve good real results in the combat training.

As we know, inspections essentially involve analyzing the state of affairs in a certain area of the combat and political training with demandingness and objectivity. And there is nothing worse, of course, than to attempt to depict the situation better than it is, to pass off the desired for the real, to gloss over shortcomings and downplay people's blame. And such things still happen. Sometimes, in the estimation of the command element, the life and training of the military collective of a unit or ship gives cause for no particular concern. The collective will even be listed among the outstanding. An inspection group or a commission from higher up arrives, however, and the picture changes drastically. Comrades who have come there from the political organ just prior to this, as it turns out, have failed to notice many negative

developments and have overlooked serious shortcomings in the training and indoctrination of the personnel and in the state of discipline. It has happened because someone did not want to air dirty linen in public and cast aside party principle. The cause suffers as a result.

Effectiveness of control is achieved not by the number of inspections or the number of shortcomings revealed in the process or by the recording of omissions, but by making them objective, by making a detailed investigation of positive and negative elements, by drawing conclusions and making evaluations on the basis of principle and by providing constructive suggestions for eliminating everything which is reducing the success. Another task of control, a preventive one involving the precluding of errors and shortcomings, is also accomplished with this approach to control. In-depth analysis of the causes of this or that negative development, planning and constancy of verification of performance and criticism of defects--all of this makes it possible to prevent omissions, to erect solid barriers to them and to prevent individual slips from developing into serious blunders.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that questions pertaining to the performance discipline of the cadres, upon whom the implementation of plans and decisions depends, occupy a central place in control as a function of supervision. It has long been observed that no decision, even one conceived in detail and with specific focus, which is based on a thorough understanding of the situation and contains precise recommendations, will be completely fulfilled if not followed up with organizational efforts by people. Verification of performance and organization of performance are a single, inseparable process, after all.

A low level of responsibility of individual workers for the assigned job is one of the causes of the poor organizational work. A study of inspections has shown that a number of political organs talk a lot and fill out a lot of papers instead of performing the actual job. The political section of which Officer V. Gogolev was chief (Volga Military District), for example, sent numerous recommendations and surveys both of higher political organs and of its own to the units. Unfortunately, however, the political organ had no objective information about how they were being implemented at the sites. It also did a poor job of monitoring the fulfillment of decisions adopted at meetings of the party aktiv. The situation in the party organizations was no better. Some activists did not consider it mandatory to fight for the fulfillment of decisions adopted.

This attitude toward the organization and execution of control could not help having a negative effect on practical matters. Commanders, political workers and party organizations lost sight of many important questions pertaining to the training and indoctrination of the personnel, the strengthening of military discipline and organization in the subunits and the enhancement of the avant-garde role of communists and Komsomol members in the training and the service. Commitments accepted by the fightingmen for the winter training period were not fulfilled in certain subunits, for example.

It should be pointed out that individual workers in the district political directorate were not setting a good example in the organization and implementation of control until recently. When they visited the units, they frequently examined the work of the party organizations only superficially and did not find the time for a thorough talk with the secretary and other activists. At the same time the monitoring of implementation of recommendations coming out of the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations was relaxed in certain party organizations, as an example. Resolutions from higher organs were frequently accepted as informational in the political directorate, and the work involving them was limited to recording the material received, printing them up and distributing them to lower political organs.

Naturally, every political organ and every party organization must carry out instructions from higher levels and its own decisions precisely and on time--that is, performance discipline must be at a high level. And being a good performer means always establishing the Leninist workstyle everywhere, in all things.

Performance discipline primarily involves that crucial factor in all undertakings, the human factor. Right now, the party teaches us, we must strive to improve the work, to bring it into conformity with the demands of the day. We must also make a psychological breakthrough in the forms and methods of control work.

The fact must be mentioned here that the essential prerequisites, one of which is that the decision be specific, must be created for organizing the implementation of decisions. Unfortunately, we still have cases in which resolutions adopted at certain meetings bear the mark of haste, suffer from formalism and do not specify ways to eliminate shortcomings, deadlines or those responsible for implementation. One sometimes looks at such a document and cannot rid himself of the thought that it was prepared in order to show that the party organization and the political organ have responded to the latest campaign. New paperwork is produced for the inspection, the formal appearance of which does not contribute to the implementation of what has been planned, since it does not bind anyone to anything. How can one avoid thinking that he who by inertia continues to believe in the magic force of paperwork, who substitutes general appeals and assurances and conference bustle for vital organizational work can ultimately ruin any vital undertaking.

Workers performing the control and verification of performance are expected to serve as a model of precision, objectivity, efficient flexibility and good organization. All of this has to be discussed, because adherence to the accustomed pattern is still having an effect in certain political organs and party organizations. Some communists take a long time bestirring themselves to implement directives. They wait for the tasks set by the central organs to be discussed at a meeting of the district (or fleet) party aktiv, then at the formation level and then in the primary party organization and are finally reflected in the appropriate plan, and only then begin implementing what has been planned and exercising supervision over it. Is there any need to mention how much valuable time is lost by this and that once again the cause suffers as a result.

Control and verification of performance achieve the desired objective when they are carried out both from above and from below. We have discussed primarily the control methods used by political organs. This work is also highly important in the life of the primary party organizations, however. They comprise the foundation of the party. And there is every basis for stating that party organizations of the army and navy are working purposefully to develop in the communists efficiency and a sense of responsibility for enhancing the combat readiness, for the mastery of the modern combat equipment and weapons and for the strengthening of military discipline. They use diverse forms of party influence for this purpose: consideration of specific questions pertaining to the military service and to the training and indoctrination of the fightingmen, the hearing of accounts and reports from the communists on their fulfillment of their service and party duty and individual talks with the communists. Party meetings have a special role. At these meetings the communists not only outline their program of action, but also bring to strict account those who are performing the assigned job poorly, do not keep their word, perform the work in a slipshod manner or tolerate infractions of party and military discipline.

At the same time, the practical work performed by army and navy party organizations indicates that certain collectives are not always highly demanding of the communists and take a simplified view of monitoring their fulfillment of duties specified in the CPSU Charter. It sometimes deals only with how a comrade carries out his assignments, attends party meetings and improves his political and military knowledge.

In order to further enhance the militancy of the party organizations, however, it is imperative that we focus attention on monitoring the fulfillment of all the clauses in the charter. This gives the primary party organization broad scope for monitoring the work. It must view the responsibility of the communists through the prism of requirements contained in the Program and Charter of the CPSU and indoctrinate them as active, selfless fighters for the party cause and for the implementation of its principles.

Periodic reports from party committees and party bureaus to party organizations and higher party organs on their work and on their fulfillment of decisions coming out meetings, proposals and critical comments from the communists are a proven form of control from below. This practice makes it possible to monitor the performance of the elected party organ and to bring to prompt account those to blame for the fact that decisions and plans are sometimes not fulfilled.

Informational reports presented by political organs and party commissions under them in the primary party organizations during the period between party conferences deserve our attention. They are becoming increasingly widespread and are fully justifying themselves as a form of control from below. The informational reports make it possible to promptly reveal deficiencies in the fulfillment of decisions adopted at party conferences and take steps to correct them, and help to increase the fighting efficiency of the primary party organizations and to enhance the activeness of the communists.

Party criticism and self-criticism are an absolute condition for improving verification of performance. The April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed with new force that all attempts to suppress or ignore justified criticism must be assessed from a standpoint of principle. In the army and navy party criticism helps to combat such negative occurrences as abuse of service position, window dressing, simplifications in the combat training, nonregulation relations, permissiveness, complacency and infractions of the standards for party life. Open criticism of shortcomings and the publicizing of monitoring activities permit not only the inspectors, but all of the communists to derive the necessary lesson and draw the proper conclusions.

The combining of control from the top with control from the bottom makes it possible to verify performance more fully and increases the responsibility both of those in charge and those under their supervision for the fulfillment of party and service duty and for the observance of party and state discipline, and promotes the development of criticism and self-criticism, a faithful weapon in the battle against shortcomings.

A great deal depends upon the secretary, his political maturity and organizational abilities with respect to improving control and verification of performance, as well as to improving all of the party organization's work. Communists with the greatest prestige are elected as party leaders. And their work should be directed in such a way that they are able to establish a serious and creative atmosphere and to unite and lead the people, that they demonstrate principle and persistence in the work and are highly demanding of those who deviate from the CPSU Charter.

The work of party commissions under the political organs is in need of further improvement. They should engage in control and verification of the implementation of directives from higher party organs in a more thorough and specific manner, especially in matters having to do with enhancing the combat readiness of the units and ships, strengthening military discipline and organization and combatting wastefulness, greed and other negative things.

The attention of party commissions will have to be focused on the main, crucial problems involved in party development, and their strengths and abilities must be efficiently used for monitoring the fulfillment of requirements contained in the CPSU Charter and the observance of party, state and military discipline. Under the supervision of the political organs, party commissions are expected to concern themselves tirelessly with the strength of the party ranks, strive to see that moral purity becomes the standard of behavior for the communists and hold strictly accountable those who violate the CPSU Charter and commit unworthy acts.

A stage involving great responsibility and importance, the reports and elections, is coming for party organizations of the army and navy. The party Central Committee calls upon us to make the main slogans of creative labor, unity of words and deeds, initiative and responsibility, demandingness of oneself and one's comrades, the dominant theme of the report-and-election meetings and of all preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. The party points out that we must be more demanding of every communist for his attitude toward

his public and party duty, for his behavior in his personal life and for his moral image.

It goes without saying that the report-and-election party meetings must contribute to the further improvement of control and verification of performance. A detailed analysis of the implementation of decisions adopted at the report-and-election meetings, of comments and proposals from the communists and decisions from higher party organs, and a critical assessment of the participation of specific responsible agents in this matter will have a great mobilizing and organizing effect upon all party members and candidate members, will help to develop their initiative even more and will contribute to the quality accomplishment of the tasks involved in the combat and political preparation and in the training and indoctrination of the fightingmen.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN OSIPOV: ONE-MAN COMMAND 'ON AN UNSHAKEABLE PARTY BASIS'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 85 (Signed to press 19 Sept 85) pp 25-32

[Article by Col Gen V. Osipov, commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "With the Force of Authority"]

[Text] One of the tank regiments in our military district is commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Sokolov. I have visited that unit more than once, scrutinized the training process, watched the personnel in action in tactical exercises, analyzed the work of the staff and the directorate and talked with the tankmen. In all of the highly diverse aspects of the regiment's life one senses the influence of its commander, an officer with good professional training, a good organizer and a thoughtful educator. Lieutenant Colonel Sokolov knows how to be firm as a commander, to see that a job begun is completed, to listen carefully to proposals from subordinates and to make the most correct decision. He enjoys great prestige not just in the unit, but also in the formation. People at division headquarters pay attention to his opinion. They have become convinced there that if Sokolov proposes his own alternative solution to a pressing problem, it means that he has carefully weighed all of the "pros" and "cons," that he has been neither hasty nor superficial in drawing his conclusions.

The regimental commander's authority is manifested not only in the fact that he knows how to make calculated decisions in the organization of the training and indoctrinational process. The commander takes a well based approach also in other questions of daily life, whether it has to do with adopting effective training methods, advancing an officer to a new position or making necessary adjustments in the work of the party or Komsomol organization. He is strict and demanding and at the same time, responsive and sensitive to the men. Subordinates frequently come to him for advice on purely personal matters. The men know that the commander will hear them out and help them to find the way out of a difficult situation.

A high level of prestige for a unit or subunit commander is one of the most important conditions for his successful functioning and an effective factor for productive combat training work, for the uniting of the military collective and the maintaining of firm regulation order. In other words, there is a perfectly obvious connection between the commander's authority, the state of affairs in the area entrusted to him and the effectiveness with which those tasks assigned to our command cadres by the party are carried out.

We know that the sole commander bears personal responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for maintaining the unit (or subunit) entrusted to him in a constant state of combat and mobilizational readiness, for the training, the indoctrination, the moral and political state and the discipline of the personnel. His official position requires that he implement the policy of the party and the government firmly and consistently, set an example for his subordinates in the strict observance of moral and ethical standards of behavior and the irreproachable observance of the Constitution of the USSR, Soviet laws, the military oath and military regulations, combine a high level of demandingness, principle and intolerance of shortcomings with trust in and respect for the personnel and constant concern for them, and not permit rudeness or abasement of their human dignity.

Ideological maturity, professional competence, a strong will and good organizational abilities are extremely important qualities essential to the commander. And this is understandable. Firmness in decisions and actions and the ability to organize the personnel, to subject them to his will and direct their efforts toward the unconditional execution of the combat mission in any situation are of paramount importance in the complex circumstances of modern combat. The abilities of an organizer and educator and the ability to organize the work on a practical level and complete it are also required for maintaining the unit in a state of combat readiness and for maintaining firm discipline in the military collective.

Right now, as we prepare actively for our next congress, the CPSU is laying special stress on enhancing the responsibility of those in charge and improving their workstyle. "The ability to operate, as Lenin taught us, 'with the force of authority, the force of energy, greater know-how, greater versatility and greater talent'," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev points out, "is of exceptional importance for us today. Fewer words, assurances and promises, and more actual deeds, practical results, responsibility and principle, coordination in the work, consideration for the people and personal modesty--this is the main measure for assessing all cadres, their ideological level and competence; this is the essence of party requirements with respect to workstyle and methods."

These requirements fully apply also to the work of communists in charge in the army collectives, the leading element in the military cadres. The accomplishment of the key tasks involved in enhancing combat readiness, strengthening discipline and organization, further improving the political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel depends primarily upon their authority, energy, know-how, talent and sense of responsibility.

The commander's authority is a multifaceted concept. On the one hand, when an individual is entrusted with commanding others, he has already received a mandate of authority, as it were, which is backed up by our military laws and customs. On the other hand, however, if a commander attempts to direct people, and especially to indoctrinate them, relying only upon the authority and power granted to him, it is doubtful that he will achieve much success. The commander must combine his official authority with personal, moral prestige. This is probably impossible, however, without a thorough understanding of his great duty, without the desire, initiative and persistence. The

main thing is to set a good personal example of conscientious, creative fulfillment of service and party duties and regulations. I would call this only the foundation of authority, however. In my opinion, authority extends beyond this--into the area of everyday relations with people, extremely complex and subtle relations.

We sometimes limit the concept of personal example and consider it only from the standpoint of the officer's professional preparedness. The commander cannot get along without competence, bold thinking, firm will, organizational abilities and the ability to accept responsibility, of course. Subordinates and even comrades in the service have a high regard primarily for that sole commander who possesses extensive knowledge, is well prepared not just theoretically, but on the practical level as well, who organizes modern combat and the training and indoctrinational process confidently and competently, and assures that every task is completed. We devote our primary attention precisely to the development of these practical qualities in commanders at all levels, from the platoon to the formation. However, life forces us to think also about why it still happens that an extremely knowledgeable officer with good military training is sometimes unable to gain prestige in the collective and directs it only with the force of the authority granted to him. This is a serious matter deserving of the most careful study, because the performance of such a commander does not measure up to the demands of the times and does not produce the desired results.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Prokofyev had many years of service behind him. He should have acquired experience in supervising people, one would have thought, and developed an understanding of his responsibility for the assigned job. When he assumed a higher position, however, he did not trouble himself with painstaking indoctrination of the fightingmen or with studying the people, and he was arrogant with officers. Not finding a common language with his subordinates, ignoring the opinion of the communists and not receiving support from them, of course, he attempted to base the organizational and indoctrinational work on purely administrative rule. Sensing that he could not properly organize the work, he lost patience and began imposing penalties right and left. His senior comrades did not straighten him out in good time. As a result, his incorrect approach turned into a habit. Naturally, however, the "easy way" chosen by the leader to establish his authority did not bring him closer to his cherished goal. On the contrary, it took him further away from the goal. This had a negative effect also upon the general state of affairs in the unit. We were finally forced to conclude that the officer had not coped with the duties with which he had been charged. Prokofyev was removed from his position.

This incident indicates a serious error in the personnel and indoctrinational work and is forcing us to assess it more demandingly. After all, if they had really worked with the officer and carefully observed his workstyle, his senior chiefs, the political organ and the party organization would unquestionably have been able to influence the individual, to help him correct his errors and thereby, to avoid going to the extreme.

Command personnel at the regimental level and particularly the battalion and company levels have become considerably younger. We therefore frequently encounter cases in which a certain commander is unable to properly handle his authority, to resolve questions pertaining to running the collective in the party manner. This is why the district military council and political directorate are placing the stress in the work performed with command cadres on developing in them a high level of party-mindedness, moral irreproachability and the ability to find a common language with the personnel. In other words, we are referring to those qualities of the individual on which his authority can be based and for which there is no substitute. The leader acquires real respect and trust only when he places party and state interests above everything else in matters large and small, when he resolves daily questions and problems from a position of principle, fairly and honestly, when he treats his colleagues with respect. Sooner or later self-interest, egoism, arrogance, rudeness, insincerity and hypocrisy will tarnish even outstanding professional, organizational and intellectual merits of a leader.

The ability to command is a complex art. With respect to subordinates, the commander is required to demonstrate firmness of will, demandingness and strict exactingness, while at the same time he must be considerate and strive to see that his instructions are correctly understood. It is possible, after all, to simply assign the task to subordinates and demand that it be accomplished without thinking about the price at which it will be done. One can also give preliminary consideration to the opinion of the other officers and the party organization, however, and work out the most acceptable and most reliable method for resolving a pressing problem. Naturally, this requires more substantial outlays of time and moral effort. It is the right way, however, primarily because it leads through the hearts of the people and is firmly linked to their attitude toward the achievement of this or that objective. It is clear that the commander who achieves the most is the one who relies on the experience, the knowledge and initiative of the masses, makes the most correct decisions, focuses the will and energy of subordinates and unites it for accomplishing the tasks specified by the party and the state. Only this kind of commander always earns real authority.

Training battles are now underway at the training grounds. In view of imperialism's aggressive preparations and the increased military danger it poses, the personnel are being prepared for any unexpected events and are being indoctrinated in a spirit of vigilance and preparedness to enter into real combat for the homeland at any time. The servicemen must be most highly attuned inwardly for the performance of this patriotic mission involving great responsibility. "Linkage with the masses. Life in the midst. Know their feelings. know everything. Understand the masses. Know how to approach them. Gain their absolute trust..."--this is what V.I. Lenin willed. Not just to possess considerable knowledge, but also the ability to draw people to oneself, to precisely organize the job--these are the qualities that Vladimir Ilich wanted to see in every Soviet leader.

Life and experience have shown that trust and respect will inevitably come for the commander if he has an irreproachable moral image and if his appeals for selflessness in the military work, for strict discipline and for exemplary

behavior in personal life conform completely to his own personal actions and are solidly supported by unity of words and deeds.

The commander's personal moral principles are becoming increasingly important today. The test of power is a serious test for a commander at any level. But do we not still frequently see people giving in to the temptation to take advantage of their position "to put the squeeze" on someone, even to amuse themselves with the idea? Such deceptive ease of directing people creates the illusion of personal authority in some people in the beginning, but it then leads to unfortunate results. A genuinely highly moral leader, however, will never give people a reason to think poorly of him. He is irreproachably honest, of course, treats those around him with respect, is patient when working with people and is capable of always remaining fair, principled and restrained, no matter how difficult things are. He does not have the right to lose his patience, to flare up or be rude.

It is not easy to be restrained and tactful. Some individual may not understand that he is going astray, that it is sometimes impossible to rapidly resolve a problem which is troubling him. Nonetheless, however, sincere consideration and respectful treatment of people, along with a high level of demandingness and principle, must be maintained in all cases. There can be no real authority without this. And one does not have to fear that demandingness will alienate subordinates. No, if it is just, people will accept it as a vital necessity. Tactful demandingness does not offend and does not degrade an individual. I stress "tactful" demandingness, because demandingness based on personal dislike and manifested in irritable rebukes has never yet strengthened the spirit or the discipline of a military collective.

One cannot hide serious moral flaws from people for long. They perceive insincerity especially acutely, even carefully concealed indifference to people. They say with justification that if one wants to know what kind of commander an individual is, ask him what he thinks about his subordinates. A good leader ordinarily speaks of his colleagues with respect and tries to give people their due, primarily accentuating their merits. People always go willingly to such commanders with their practical suggestions and personal requests. They know that the commander will always understand them correctly and will always support anything which is beneficial. And if he sees that the individual needs help, he will always provide it, without considering his personal time and not sparing his efforts.

I believe that precisely such actions not only characterize the leader in the very best possible manner, but also give him genuine satisfaction. No, it is not demandingness which makes certain officers sometimes incapable of establishing a rapport with those whom they are entrusted to command. This happens when a commander, even a disciplined and competent one, behaves like an inaccessible chief, exhibits conceit and arrogance, does not listen to people and forgets about his duty to show concern for them. Alienation of subordinates is inevitable in this case. And this cannot be tolerated, since the cause ultimately suffers as a result.

We frequently speak of a commander's caliber as a teacher. It is not simply a matter of mastering a collection of rules, however. Once again, there is

a political and moral basis. It is manifested not in words or statements. When it exists, people simply feel it. And they are drawn to such a person. They trust him.

The district military council, political directorate and staff give constant attention to the selection, the training and indoctrination of commanders who will firmly and skillfully implement party policy and party demands, successfully accomplish the tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for further enhancing the combat readiness of the units and subunits and for strengthening military discipline, and enjoy the deserved prestige and respect of subordinates. We strive to see that every communist-and-leader thoroughly understands the enormous responsibility placed upon him by his position, selflessly and zealously fulfills his duties and truly provides highly effective training and indoctrination.

Just prior to the beginning of the summer training period we conducted an assembly of unit commanders. The central issue discussed was the leader's role in providing good field training for the troops, good organization and order. Group and individual talks which the chief of the district political directorate, a member of the military council, and I had with the commanders attending the assembly reinforced our conviction that in general we have well trained and authoritative cadres. Politically mature and militarily competent officers with initiative, officers who want to work with people and know how to do so, head our military collectives.

We attempt to publicize the outstanding commanders, the most prestigious ones, and to make their experience available to all. We consider it most important to show the typical features of their workstyle and the specific features of their approach to the resolution of key questions in the organization of training and indoctrination for subordinates.

Among other things, when Lieutenant Colonel V. Agafonov summarized his experience, the stress was on revealing how the sole commander relies on the party organization and how skillfully and tactfully he focuses the work of the communists on the accomplishment of the combat training and the political and indoctrinational tasks. How does he perform the individual work with the personnel, how does he handle discipline and how thoroughly does he study the state of affairs in the collective? Only after thoroughly answering all of these questions is it possible to understand the most important thing: Exactly how did the commander acquire his great authority, and what should the young and less experienced officers learn from him?

Why do we feel that it is important today to take this approach to the publicizing of progressive experience? Because life and numerous observations have shown that many of our commanders, particularly the young ones, still do not have the necessary methodological preparedness. Furthermore, the praxis of summarizing the progressive commander's experience frequently suffers from a typical shortcoming. That side of the officer's work which shows the broad range of his duties and the number of measures carried out is revealed convincingly and well, but the most valuable aspect, the leader's workstyle, is poorly reflected or goes unnoticed entirely.

This style is shaped and tested for soundness each day in ordinary situations of service and life and sometimes in situations of conflict. Has the officer investigated a subordinate's infraction objectively and revealed the true reasons for his behavior, let us say, or has he acted in haste and made an unfair decision? Is the commander capable of being observant, of seeing distinctions in his subordinates, in their views, or does he apply the same measure to all of them without considering these factors important for indoctrination? When he gives his word to people, does he strictly keep it? Is he honest and principled in assessing the state of discipline and the combat training of the personnel?

We have to admit that until recently not all of the district staff and directorate officers and some of those in charge of formations and units gave proper attention to these questions. Their reasoning was approximately the following: If the unit or subunit accomplishes the tasks set for it and if regulation order is maintained at a satisfactory level there, this means that everything is in order, that the commander, the political worker and the party organization are on the right track. And then suddenly letters and complaints begin coming in from fighting units in certain "good" collectives about rudeness and spiritual callousness on the part of individual officers and about the distortion of disciplinary practices. A more thorough investigation at the sites revealed that the workstyle of those leaders was not without flaws: They deliberately exaggerated the successes, concealed shortcomings and sometimes made hasty decisions without worrying about how this would affect the minds of the people and the moral climate in the collective. How could one expect the officer to have authority in this situation?

We sharply condemned cases of this in the party manner in the district military council when we discussed our tasks for increasing the responsibility and improving the workstyle of command and political personnel in light of instructions issued at the April and July 1985 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's talk in Minsk to directing personnel of the Armed Forces. The military council has outlined a number of specific steps for making a more thorough study of the political, practical and moral qualities of unit commanders and candidates for that high position, for teaching them the Lenin style of work and leadership and for readjusting their thinking and their practical work in accordance with the demands of the times.

It has long been known that an individual's sense of responsibility for the assigned job is determined primarily by the depth of his ideological convictions and by the level of his awareness and his political maturity. And this depends in great part upon the quality and effectiveness of the ideological work and the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers. We consider increasing the influence of the political training upon the officers' practical affairs and their workstyle to be one of the main reserves for enhancing the authority of our command cadres. It not only permits the commanders to gain a more thorough understanding of current problems of party theory and policy, of military organizational development and of the armed defense of the socialist homeland, but also develops in them a need to apply the knowledge they acquire in their practical work, to operate in accordance with the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements set forth by the USSR minister of defense.

Within the system of the Marxist-Leninist training for officers of the district in recent years perceptible stress has been placed on achieving unity of knowledge, convictions and deeds on the part of the students and on closely coordinating classes in the groups with life and with the tasks being performed by the units and subunits--that is, with their practical activities. There are many positive things, for example, in the way classes are conducted in the group headed by Colonel V. Suvorov. The lectures and seminars there discuss theoretical and practical issues in close unity and analyze the experience of outstanding commanders and the causes of failure by those who have lowered their sense of responsibility and damaged their prestige. All of this makes the personnel aware of the need both to adopt the know-how of the best personnel and to draw conclusions from shortcomings and work to enhance their authority.

Political awareness, a broad cultural perspective and erudition as a whole are not things an officer acquires once and for all at a school or academy. They have to be nourished each day with systematic independent work. A study performed by the district political directorate in a number of units, however, has shown that certain leaders at the regimental level have not yet grasped decisions of CPSU Central Committee plenums with adequate thoroughness and do not read newspapers and magazines every day, not to speak of creative literature. They ordinarily say that they are too busy and do not have enough time. No matter what the circumstances, however, time must be found for one's spiritual growth. He who does not do this simply falls behind life and understandably avoids making talks to the fightingmen or engaging in vital communication with the personnel just because he has nothing with which to do so. Truisms and idle talk are not accepted by the personnel today. In short, the problem of developing a desire for knowledge and self-improvement and of organizing the officer's duty hours more efficiently requires close attention and thoroughly conceived resolution.

A commander earns authority primarily himself, with his deeds, his actions and his conduct, with good party qualities and efficiency in his work. Errors and blunders large and small occur in life, however. No one is protected against them. The degree to which an officer is self-critical and demanding of himself and his ability to derive the correct lesson for the future have a particularly important role in this matter. Not everyone is capable of this, however. And this is where the senior chief must have something to say, must find a way to approach the individual and be strictly demanding of him. Demandingness combined with respect for the other person's dignity and with painstaking individual work--this is one of the main ways in which our commanders can enhance their authority. There is a solid logical connection: The higher the level of demandingness, the more extensive is the sense of responsibility, and the more extensive the sense of responsibility, the stronger is the commander's authority, the more productive is his organizational and indoctrinational work and the better the state of affairs in the unit or subunit.

The political organs, party committees and party organizations have a great role in maintaining the authority of commanders. One-man command is exercised in our army on an unshakeable party basis. On the one hand, this means that

in all of the commander's work he is constantly guided by the policy, the decisions and requirements of the CPSU, constantly relies upon the party organization and uses its mobilizing force and creative activeness to improve the combat readiness of the unit or subunit. On the other hand, every party organization is expected to do everything possible to strengthen the sole commander's authority, to maintain his demandingness, to develop in the personnel trust in and respect for the commander and the regarding of his orders and instructions as an inviolable law. However, the political organs and party commissions cannot remain indifferent when a certain communist-and-leader taints his reputation with improper acts, abuses his service position, becomes alienated from the personnel and does not listen to advice or recommendations.

Party organs do not always take a position of principle in such cases, however. Why not? In my opinion, there are several reasons. It is frequently a "fear" of undermining the commander's authority by punishing him for errors in his workstyle or his conduct or for violating moral standards. It is sometimes an inability to find the correct way to exert a party influence upon an officer-and-leader who reacts negatively to criticism. It is a lack of principle on the part of individual political workers, party secretaries and members of party committees and bureaus in assessing the improper actions of this or that officer-and-communist. All of this taken together is what sometimes produces undesirable, negative occurrences.

Not long ago, for example, officer S. Zhikharev was brought to strict party accountability and discharged from the Armed Forces. This leader felt that the laws and regulations were not written for him. For a long time he violated them and engaged in the squandering of materiel. What is more, as it was later learned, the deterioration of his reputation occurred before the eyes of party activists. Unfortunately, however, no one sounded the alarm in good time, and for a long time no one attempted to put the greedy individualist who had gone too far in his place. The "deeds" of such a leader have far-reaching moral consequences, have undesirable repercussions and cast a shadow on the Soviet officer's glorious name. It is therefore inadmissible to exhibit liberalism with respect to such leaders who discredit their authority.

In order to operate with the force of authority, every commander must first of all work to develop a broad political perspective and thorough professional skill, to exhibit an irreproachable moral image and be close to people. He must also have attention and support from the senior chief, the political organ and the party organization, however. They are the ones who are expected to help the officer grow in every respect, correct the individual in good time, point out his errors and hold him fully accountable when necessary. When we concern ourselves with enhancing the authority of our command cadres every day, we are thereby creating the conditions essential for the officer personnel to successfully accomplish the tasks assigned to them by the Communist Party. And these tasks involve that most important thing, enhancing the combat readiness, strengthening discipline, mobilizing the personnel to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner and providing reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: DOCUMENTS ON PARTY-POLITICAL WORK, 1929-1941

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sept 85 (Signed to press 19 Sept 85) pp 89-92

[Review by Col (Ret) A. Pozmogov of the book "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii. Dokumenty. Iyul 1929 g.-may 1941 g." (Party-Political Work in the Red Army: Documents, July 1929-May 1941), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1985, 535 pages]

[Text] Valuable Experience in Party-Political Work

This collection of documents on party-political work in the Red Army covers an important and complex period in the life of our nation and its Armed Forces.

The world's first state of the workers was proceeding confidently along the path of building socialism. The nation's industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture were being successfully accomplished. Friendship of peoples of the USSR was gaining strength, the socialist culture was undergoing all-around development, and the society's moral-political unity was developing and intensifying.

In view of the ever increasing aggressiveness of imperialism's policy and its preparations for a new military attack against the Soviet Nation, which especially increased with the assumption of power by the fascists in Germany and Italy and the capture of Chinese provinces bordering on the USSR by Japan, the Communist Party was taking extensive steps to strengthen the nation's defense capability. A military industry capable of providing our army and navy with modern weapons and combat equipment was being created at an accelerated rate. The Red Army was converted from the combined (regular and territorial) system of manning and training to an entirely regular system, and its numerical strength was increased. Troop command and control and the training of military cadres were being improved.

The party's leading role in the army and navy and its influence upon the life and work of the forces were steadily growing. Questions pertaining to military organizational development and to party-political work in the Armed Forces were discussed at congresses of the party and at plenums of its Central Committee.

The documents published in this collection reveal the substance and the specific features of party-political work and the ways in which it was being improved during the period of technical reconstruction and organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces and their active preparation for repelling imperialist aggression.

The collection includes 211 documents. Many of them have to do with the improvement of the structure of political organs, party and Komsomol organizations and the organizational structures of the party-political apparatus, and with the intensification of its influence upon the combat training and the combat readiness of the forces.

The Decree on the Political Directorate of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army], which was approved in October 1929, charged it with directing party, political and political-educational work in all of the units, establishments and institutions of the Red Army, as well as the military-political preparation of the workers undergoing pre-draft preparation and military training outside the forces (page 35 in the collection). The statute defined the Political Directorate's structure and specified its functions.

The 3rd All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Party Organizations was held in 1931. It had a considerable effect with respect to enhancing the role of party organizations and improving the intra-party work. The conference approved resolutions on the tasks of the party cell in the combat and political training, on party-organizational and mass agitation work, on the specific features of work in the rapidly developing new branches of troops--mechanized, armored and air units--at military training institutions and so forth (pp 150-196). They stressed the fact that party-political work is not a goal in itself but one of the main means of building up the strength of the Red Army, that its task is one of improving the combat training and enhancing the combat readiness of the subunits and units.

With the decisions coming out of that conference in mind, the party Central Committee worked out and ratified the new Instructions to Organizations of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] and the Red Army. It stated that party organizations "are required to devote all of their work to building-up the fighting strength of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army by uniting its soldiers round the VKP(b) and indoctrinating them in a spirit of selfless devotion to the cause of socialism." They must "assure the exemplary study of military affairs and the absolute mastery of the combat equipment by every communist and Komsomol member, by every Red Army man, every commander and political worker, and strengthen military discipline in the army" (p. 283). It was made their duty to provide the personnel with Marxist-Leninist tempering and to indoctrinate them in a spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The party and its Central Committee applied themselves constantly to strengthening party ranks in the Armed Forces. The decree passed by the VKP(b) Central Committee, which altered the conditions and the procedure for accepting the rank and file under the party (February 1933), played an important role in this matter. It considerably expended opportunities for Red Army men and junior commanders to join the party ranks.

The political organs and party organizations increased their indoctrinational work with the Komsomol and non-party aktiv, the study of the aktiv from its practical deeds and its inclusion into the party. At the same time, as a result of the numerical growth of party organizations, steps were taken to increase the political indoctrination of the young communists, to improve intra-party work, to enhance the role of party meetings and strengthen party discipline.

The party devoted a great deal of attention to the work of Komsomol organizations and to enhancing their role in the life of the forces. In November 1930 the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Komsomol Central Committee and the Political Directorate of the RKKA approved the Statute on the Work of Komsomol Cells in the Red Army. It stated that as a component of the entire Komsomol, the army Komsomol is the immediate assistant of the party organizations in all of the work and that its main purpose is to strengthen the fighting efficiency of the RKKA in every possible way, to unite the Red Army masses round the party and to provide its members with a Bolshevik indoctrination on the basis of its general line (p. 125). The statute defined the specific tasks, the organizational structure, the work forms and methods of Komsomol cells.

The 1st All-Army Conference of Komsomol Workers was held in 1937. It discussed the tasks of Komsomol organizations and their place in the military organizational development under the circumstances of establishing a mass army. Based on the conference recommendations, the new Statute on Komsomol Organizations in the Red Army was adopted in March 1938 (pp 344-352). It stressed once again the fact that the work of Komsomol organizations is an inseparable part of all the party-political work in the RKKA and is performed under the direct supervision of political organs and party organizations. "The Komsomol in the Red Army is the assistant of VKP(b) organizations and the main reserve for replenishing its ranks in the RKKA."

The exacerbation of the international situation and the increased threat of a military attack on our nation made it necessary to increase the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and to expand the training of military cadres correspondingly. Young commanders with inadequate experience in political leadership of the troops were advanced to high positions. In order to strengthen the leadership of the troops and naval forces, on 8 May 1937 the VKP(b) Central Committee and the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of the USSR passed a decree on the establishment of military councils in the military districts, fleets and armies and on the establishment of the institution of military commissars in the military units and formations, at training institutions, in the staffs and directorates, and political instructors in the companies.

The military commissars were to take over the organization of party-political work and to assist the commanders in directing the troops. The institution of deputy and assistant political instructors in companies and equivalent subunits was established in April 1938. Communists and Komsomol members from among the Red Army men and junior commanders were appointed to these positions. They provided a considerable reserve for the training and replenishment of regular political workers. The best of them, those who had proved themselves

in the practical work, were sent for training to courses for junior political instructors and to district military-political schools and were listed as army and navy cadres.

The establishment of personal military ranks for command personnel of the Armed Forces by a 22 September 1935 decree of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and the SNK of the USSR also helped to improve the qualifications and the prestige of military cadres.

We know that the training of command personnel in a considerably expanded system of military training institutions and other steps to improve it, and the young commanders' acquisition of experience in directing troops, including the directing of troops in combat situations, made it possible in the years following to establish complete one-man command in the army as the most important principle underlying Soviet military organizational development.

The period covered in the collection was characterized by a rise in the level and intensity of all forms of ideological work in the army and navy: Marxist-Leninist education of command personnel, political classes for Red Army men and junior commanders, party education of communists and Komsomol members, education and propaganda work, cultural and educational work among the servicemen and their families. Its objectives and tasks, organization, content and experience are discussed in materials of the 2nd All-Army Agitation and Propaganda Conference held in July 1930 (pp 61-109) and in a number of directives issued by the Political Directorate of the RKKA. A 22 June 1939 directive pointed out, among other things, the inadmissibility of mere educational activities in the ideological work, of departing from the propagation of military culture and the explanation of international relations, of divorcing oneself from the most important questions in the life of the units.

"As we develop the theory of Marxism-Leninism and improve the propaganda of that theory in accordance with decisions of the VKP(b) Central Committee," the directive stated, "we must in no case forget the military and production propaganda.... The only army party or non-party Bolshevik who has mastered Bolshevism is the one who knows how to apply the theory in praxis, who uses the powerful tool of Marxist-Leninist theory in his work to enhance the combat readiness of the RKKA" (pp 374-375).

When World War II began, the political training for the rank and file and for the junior command personnel and all of the agitation and propaganda work began devoting greater attention to military, patriotic and international indoctrination, to clarification of the nature of the war which had broken out and to exposing imperialism's aggressive policy.

The technical re-equipment of the army made it necessary for the personnel to master new equipment and weapons, to improve the technical military propaganda and to explain the points contained in the military regulations and the tasks involved in the combat and political training. The collection also contains a great deal of material on this matter.

The work of cultural and educational institutions--Red Army centers, clubs, libraries and Lenin rooms--and their role in the training and indoctrination of the personnel are defined in directives issued by the Political Directorate of the RKKA and a number of statutes on these centers of culture (pp 89, 91, 123 and 225, for example).

DKA [red army clubs], as the officers' clubs were called at that time, were ordered to become real militant centers of political agitation and the study of Marxist-Leninist theory in the garrisons. The task was one of resolutely improving the officer training on the basis of combat training plans in the units and formations, organizing lectures and reports on the modern military equipment at home and abroad, establishing groups, seminars and courses for studying the materiel and the tactical and operational use of the technical equipment, showing technical military films, and so forth.

The task of organizing "cultural leisure-time activities for command personnel, particularly on their days of rest, was defined as the most important task in the work of the DKA. The DKA..., which has not become a place to which the command personnel go with pleasure during their hours of rest is not justifying its purpose" (pp 226-227). It was proposed that walks in the country, tourist outings and group days of rest (including families) be conducted and that a resolute effort be made to improve the artistic services and mass physical culture among command personnel.

The work of the military press focused on improving the combat and political training and on enhancing the cultural and technical level of the fightingmen. The collection contains a number of documents defining the tasks of central, district and battalion (brigade) Red Army newspapers with respect to the political and military indoctrination of the personnel and the publicizing of military knowledge and progressive experience in the combat training (pp 94, 245, 379, 441).

The increased complexity of military affairs made it necessary to raise the general educational level of the rank and file and command personnel, which at that time did not always measure up to the new tasks involved in the combat, technical and political preparation of the Red Army. Mandatory general education classes were established for Red Army men and regular junior commanders with no education beyond primary school. This was done during the 1935/36 academic year by an order of the People's Commissar of Defense and a directive of the Political Directorate of the RKKA, and a mandatory initial minimum was established for all commanders and chiefs, the equivalent of a program of incomplete secondary schooling. The general educational level of command personnel was taken into consideration for certification and movement in the service (pp 107, 142, 240, 339 and others).

The development of invention and rationalization work in all components of the Armed Forces helped to accelerate the army's technical re-equipment and to expand the technical perspective of the servicemen. "It is an extremely important task in the political work to 'turn brains toward the equipment'," stated a directive issued by the Political Directorate of the RKKA on 28/30 September 1930 (p 116).

The Statute on the Mass Rationalization Movement in the RKKA was issued. A permanent conference of representatives of a number of central organs of the People's Commissariat of Defense was created for intensifying this work and accelerating the realization of rationalization proposals. It was charged with prompt determination of the suitability of inventions for defense needs. Inventor groups were set up in the forces. The command element of units and formations and the chiefs of district and central directorates were ordered to resolutely improve the supervision of invention work, to set up consultations for inventors, to reward the best of them and to provide for the systematic improvement of their skills (pp 260-262).

The organization of physical training for the fightingmen was an important area of work of commanders, the party-political apparatus, cultural and educational institutions of the Armed Forces. Introduction of a statute on mass physical culture and sports work in the RKKA, participation in which was mandatory for all regular personnel, was introduced by order of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense]. In a directive issued on 23 June 1940, the Political Directorate of the RKKA demanded that we "end the underestimation of mass sports as a means of physical education for the soldier and the commander.... Make physical culture and sports one of the main types of mass cultural work on the part of political organs, party and Komsomol organizations" (p 420).

Socialist competition focused on the successful accomplishment of tasks involved in the combat and political training of the personnel. Its specific tasks and its forms and methods of organization were described in a number of directives issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the Political Directorate of the RKKA (pp 16, 42, 59, 357, 422). Excellent mastery of the equipment and weapons, improvement of the fire and tactical training and development of rationalization and invention work were the main objectives of the competition.

An 11 December 1938 directive charged the commissars and the chiefs of political organs with leading the political activeness of the Red Army masses and expanding competition to the entire Red Army, striving to see that subunit competed with subunit, unit with unit.... "Every party organization, every communist and Komsomol member must become leaders in a competition opening up new possibilities in the use of the combat equipment.... Meetings of company and primary party and Komsomol organizations and meetings of command personnel and Red Army men must systematically sum up the results of the socialists competition and familiarize the entire mass of Red Army men and commanders with the best models" (p 358).

The documents contained in the collection demonstrate the party Central Committee's constant concern for training the political workers, expanding the system of military-political training institutions, intensifying the officer training of political workers, having them study the military disciplines and organizing refresher training for political workers in the reserve.

The need to intensify the direct training of the Armed Forces for combat operations in the circumstances of modern warfare also necessitated a corresponding reorganization of party-political work, bringing it into maximum conformity

with the need to teach the troops everything needed in a war. The new tasks of the political organs were set forth in a 28 August 1940 directive: "On the Reorganization of Party-Political Work for Purposes of Subordinating it to the Tasks Involved in Enhancing the Combat Readiness of the Army and Strengthening Military Discipline" (pp 428-434).

During that period the political organs and party organizations thoroughly studied experience in party-political work in a combat situation: during the battles fought with the Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River, in Finland and during the Red Army's liberation campaigns into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. The organization and the substance of party-political work in a combat situation were described in a number of directives issued by the Political Directorate of the RKKA (pp 376, 395, 408, 410).

The material contained in the book demonstrates the purposefulness and effectiveness of party-political work performed during the 30's and just prior to the Great Patriotic War and its all-around influence upon the life and work of the troops. It makes it possible to thoroughly study that experience and to derive from it those valuable things which can be used in the contemporary situation. The collection is recommended as a scientific reference aid for officers, generals and admirals of the Armed Forces, for cadets, students and instructors at military training institutions.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES, MAY-JUNE

Scrap Hauling Increasing Costs

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 85 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel P. Romashin: "Those Expensive Kilometers"]

[Text] Dear editor! The ispolkom [executive committee] of our gorsovet [town soviet] decided a while back to centralize food scraps collection. But any decision can prove wrong if it doesn't consider the actual situation. And so the house management of our KECh [billeting operation unit] has to deliver scraps to a collection point located 75 kilometers from the buildings where scraps are collected.

Now let us do some calculating. No more than 23 tons of scraps are collected in a month and the cost is 299 rubles (one ton costs 13 rubles). Daily travel for vehicles collecting scraps is about 200 kilometers or about 5000 kilometers per month. If you consider the cost of gasoline and the salaries of the people who do this work, you get a round sum of 1,494 rubles. The result is that because of excessive transportation costs, "supper" for our swine is five times more expensive than it has to be.

And we have swine-breeding in our area that is closer. There are other possible methods for resolving the problem. Some responsible comrades simply have to do a little arithmetic so as not to throw state funds into the wind.

Instructors Set Poor Example

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 85 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Nagornyy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Prisoner of Complacency"]

[Text] Some time ago there were several examples of gross violations of military discipline in a subunit at the Engels Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School of PVO [Air Defense]. This outbreak of disciplinary delinquencies was like thunder on a clear day to both the subunit commander and the school's leaders, for things had been satisfactory for many years and then suddenly, this.

But was it sudden? The author of the letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA who reported the state of affairs in the school's subunit recited a whole list of reasons that had led to the lower level of military discipline. And as was disclosed during the follow-up, since not all of these reasons were really well-founded, it is very evident that behind every delinquency have been serious omissions in the training-indoctrination work with the cadets. And the conclusion given by the letter's author is self-evident. It is impossible to reconcile oneself with the fact that these future officers, people who will soon be entrusted to educate people, have not learned to observe regulatory requirements and the norms of our morals.

Now the delinquents and those who had pandered to them because of their lack of scruples have been severely punished. With this in mind, perhaps one should not remember the past, except for one thing that catches one's attention -- judging from available information, some of the school's officers are in no hurry to draw any conclusions from what took place. For example, some still calmly look at things like some of their subordinates' use of alcoholic beverages and the easy with which they "draft" alcohol at cadet wedding where, they say, it is almost uncomfortable to manage without intoxicating drinks. There also seems to be no special concern about the fact that there are still individual cases of cadets being absent without authorization.

One can only explain this type of complacency in only one way. People in the school have not made a thorough analysis of the reasons for the disciplinary violations. They punished the offenders and closed the cases at that point. One has to recall the analogy of the inexperienced doctor who uses the maximum dose of approved medications to slow the illness or drive the enemy within, without trying to understand the symptoms of the illness. If one is to discuss the real reasons for the "enemy" that is bothering the school, then it would seem that the enemy is the fact that the long relative disciplinary well-being took the edge off a number of commanders' and political workers' feelings of responsibility for reinforcing discipline. And many of them stopped setting an example for subordinates.

Former cadet Yu. Yakunin left bad memories among his comrades when he left. People at the school speak about his low moral qualities and the new facts about his unworthy behavior that are still coming to light with belated anger. He deceived comrades, was inclined to be money grubbing and had many other dishonorable faults. Yet Captain V. Balykin found nothing reprehensible in the faults of his subordinate. Moreover, Yakunin was entrusted to carry out the duties of a subunit warrant. The battery commander officer trusted his warrant officer unconditionally. And when Yakunin procured a bottle of liquor, the Balykin was not against joining company and would talk about being increasingly strict on cadets under these very circumstances .

Moreover, the subunit commander knew that the unrestrained junior officer's "exactingness" often manifested itself through common petty tyranny and the issuance of absurd instructions in the name of his sponsor. The end of this story was natural -- the subunit commander was removed from his position and Yakunin said farewell to the school forever.

Unfortunately there are other facts that show that many officers did not set an example for their subordinates through strict discipline and irreproachable completion of their service obligations. And apparently it was no accident that the "outbreak" of disciplinary violations that was mentioned above took place in a subunit where several of the officers (including V. Artemov and Yu. Chushkin) had received several punishments for omissions in service.

A large number of the disciplinary punishments imposed on officers take place in the school today as proof of the constant struggle to strengthen regulatory order. However we must say one thing about this. By setting their hopes on the use of punishment, it seems that people in the school see only it, this force, as the primary way to bring regulatory order. Yet educating through positive examples and tedious daily work used to prevent violations have still not produced appreciable results. And apparently because it these are basically activated during those periods when someone has committed a gross violation. This approach to organizing educational work sometimes gives rise to impulsiveness, mass punishment and the use of coercion methods over cadets that are in no way justified.

For example, one artillery battalion took advantage of the fact that there were many local natives among the cadets and began to have parent conferences. Setting this up as an advanced experiment, political worker officer R. Mikaelyan very seriously related how cadet conduct is discussed at these conferences, how recommendations are made to parents on how they can increase their influence over their sons and what claims they have on moms and pops.

At the same time, people in the school forget about the tried and true methods of educational work. For example, they forget how to attract officers from the faculty to do individual work with cadets. Some of these faculty members associate with cadets only in the auditorium -- they give a lecture and that's that. And many of them have been formally appointed as subunit sponsors. But what kind of sponsors can they be if for example, senior instructor Colonel A. Meshcheryakov didn't even know the name of the battery commander of his appointed unit.

And the educational role of obvious propaganda is clearly overestimated in the school. In one Lenin Room, which by the way was considered the best, the first thing that struck the eye was the slovenliness of the stand design. Map boards were put up at random and many should have been redone long ago. One would have had to look carefully for any noteworthy materials which would have indoctrinated a cadet with a feeling of pride for the officer's profession and with the desire to follow the subunits' positive traditions. One could not find a single mention of subunit pupils there and many of them now hold responsible positions in the force and have been decorated with state awards.

There is obviously no need to further recount the indoctrinational possibilities which are not being used or which are being used short of their potential. These and other omissions are also giving rise to a feeling of placidity and complacency in some commanders and a spirit of conciliation in others of them.

And to all of this must be added the fact that there are many cases where officers, who by dint of their work and moral qualities are unworthy of teaching and indoctrinating cadets, are being assigned to command and instructor positions in the school. These people are a lot of trouble to the VUZ [institution of higher education] command. One such person, Captain S. Perfilyev, was under severe party punishment for lack of personal discipline when he arrived at the academy to fill the position of platoon commander. He now has a slipshod attitude toward his responsibilities and has been warned about incomplete service compliance. And there are others officers whose assignments to the school can in no way be considered well-founded or dictated by a desire to train military cadres. It is unclear what is prompting some officials to send officers to the school who have compromised themselves in the forces.

The Engels School has a long, glorious tradition. Its good name is well known among air defense rocket forces and the large detachment of commanders and instructors who have skillfully trained and are training highly-qualified junior officers have brought it glory. And it is now important to use party principles and strictly and fundamentally evaluate the situation which has occurred with the discipline in some subunits. The school has all the capabilities to elevate the training-indoctrination process to the level of contemporary demands.

Illegal Construction Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 85 p 2

[From the "After Appearing In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section]

[Text] "Garages and Mirages" was the title of Senior Lieutenant I. Ivanyuk's topical satire that was published 2 February 1985. The satire discussed the confusion concerning buildings that arose during the construction of ramps around living quarters in one of our garrisons.

Major General of Justice B. Gordeyev, military procurator of the Transcaucasus Military District, informed the editor that he discovered the following while verifying the facts contained in the satire.

The ramps were being constructed on ground that was not allotted to the USSR Ministry of Defense. After the projects under construction were put into operation, part of the buildings under the ramps were occupied by private citizens who adapted them as garages. This took place with the connivance of former rayon KECh chief Major V. Shulyak who did not take steps to incorporate the buildings into the record system in accordance with existing procedures.

The answer also indicates that several personal garages near the ramp were illegally constructed by private citizens, including workers from billeting operations agencies. And military builders were used. There are no covering vouchers for a large amount of the construction materials used in constructing the garages and there is reason to suppose that the garages were built with materials allotted for construction of living quarters. The garrison procurator was ordered to conduct a separate inquiry into these facts.

As Colonels F. Yastin and L. Petrovskiy reported to the editor, the newspaper's publication was acknowledge to be correct and was discussed at a joint meeting of unit and billeting operations agency leaders.

As a result of the steps that were taken, the service buildings that had been occupied by private citizens were vacated. Lieutenant Colonel S. Merinov, UNR [office of the work supervisor] chief, was disciplined for his lack of control over use of the buildings.

A response signed by billeting operations agency chief Colonel L. Kashechkin and party organization secretary Lieutenant Colonel V. Kovalenko reported that deputy chief and head engineer of the the rayon's billeting operations unit Captain V. Machekhin was reprimanded for lack of control in registering and using service buildings. KECh chief Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Rastegayev was given a reproof for being frequently absent from his post.

Lieutenant General N. Kashechkin who is temporarily holding the post of Chief of the Main Billeting Operations Directorate for the USSR Ministry of Defense informed the editor that Colonel Kashechkin was instructed to apply to the gorsovet to get the section of land that the service buildings actually occupy under the trestle allotted to the Ministry of Defense and to put them on the rayon KECh record.

Construction Problems, Responsibilities Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 85 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Ivankov, deputy chief of Construction and Force Billeting for the USSR Ministry of Defense, conducted by Ye. Sorokin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Value The Honor Of A Builder"]

[Text] [Question] Nowhere in the world is there more construction than in our country. Cities and villages are changing and getting better looking right before our eyes. In just four years of this Five-Year Plan approximately 40 million Soviet people have improved their living conditions and celebrated house-warmings. What part have military builders played in this major construction effort?

[Answer] Military builders who are occupied with organizing public services and amenities in military cities and garrisons, are thus making a significant contribution to resolving the over-all state program of residential construction. During the five-year plan they have build thousands of living quarters, dozens of clubs and officer's clubs, schools and kindergardens, stores and dining halls and other social-domestic buildings. In short, they have build a lot and done it well.

For example, the complex of buildings and structures in the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, the military hospital at Khabarovsk, the medical corps at the sanitorium at Feodosiya, the sports complex in the Carpathian Military District and a number of other projects meet the highest requirements.

The military construction collective is actively participating in the All-Union Public Review and Competition for the best construction and I must say they are achieving excellent results in it. For example, in 1984 construction directorates of the Belorussian and Odessa Military Districts were awarded Honorary Letters. Builders in the Moscow, Kiev and Carpathian Military Districts are constantly improving the quality of their work, as are the organizations headed by officers E. Borisov, V. Dukhin, A. Gorovatskiy, B. Bezmenov and others.

The advances they have made are certainly not the end. Now all military districts and fleets are making the transition to building large-panel living quarters with improved room plans. Last year more than half of the living quarters that military builders put into operation were homes built from new plans and complete transition is scheduled to be completed by 1988.

In short, military builders have everything they need today so that every residence built by their hands brings happiness to the new settler.

[Question] But, judging by letters from our readers, the happiness of new settlers is still often overshadowed by slipshod finishing work and the large number of imperfections. For example, here is what Major A. Vronskiy from Maritime Kray wrote. "I would not change a single garrison in my years of service and I have been in the most remote. I know how difficult it is for military builders to put up a good quality residence and I thank them for their selfless labor. But I recently got new quarters and instead of the happiness of a new settler, I experienced indignation. The doors were warped, the walls in one room were papered with different wall paper, water dripped out of a faucet and there were cracks as big as a finger in the floor. Lieutenant Colonel V. Garshman cheerfully assured me that the defects would be corrected, but time is passing and I don't see any construction workers. What is most disappointing is that the house was built with new plans which are modern and well organized..." The editorial mail has an abundance of letters with similar complaints. What are the reasons for such facts?

[Answer] There are actually still many pretension to quality. One of the main reasons is rush work which gives rise to both defects in builders' work and in construction planning. An appropriation of at least 35 percent of the estimated cost of houses must be allotted to construction work done ahead of time to guarantee that residences are completed at a constant pace throughout the year. Yet customers actually provide no more than 10-15 percent to this.

Late decisions on issues associated with preparing project estimate documentation, the design of the land plots under the building, utility construction (electricity, heat and others) all have a considerable impact on construction rhythm. For example, for this reason alone we still have not been able to begin construction on many residences that are supposed to be completed this year.

Delivery times for residential construction as defined by contracts are frequently not met, especially when construction is done by enterprises from

other ministries and departments (approximately one-third of our construction site requirements fall into this category),

And in the end, all of this leads to the fact that a little more than three times the number of residences are turned over during the fourth quarter, and more precisely, in December than in the first. But there are no more workers, for there is no place to get additional finish workers.

But all the same, I would say that the primary reason is the fact that not all construction workers feel enough personal responsibility to the tenant. Waste is often allowed because of an elementary lack of discipline, lack of organization and a careless attitude to business. And commanders and political workers are still not showing the necessary exactingness everywhere.

There is no doubt that we cannot reconcile ourselves with this situation. We are making harsher demands on people for poor quality completion of construction-assembly work. For example, in 1984 in the Northern Fleet Construction Directorate alone 22 managers were held materially responsible and 26 were disciplined for poor quality of work completion.

Directions from the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and other party and governmental resolutions aimed at improving construction are providing clear reference points to resolving this very important economic, economical and social task.

At the present time the USSR Ministry of Defense is making up a set of measures designed to guarantee a substantial improvement in the quality of residential and social and cultural-domestic construction in the very near future.

[Question] But all of this is in the future. Yet if builders have made mistakes today, they must immediately eliminate the imperfections. And here is what happens. The builders walk around the new settlers' rooms, entreat them to sign the statement that they have no claims and builders promise to eliminate the defects. Then they forget! N. Mozhayskaya writes us from Kaliningrad Oblast, "I got new quarters and my troubles began. Regardless of where I turned, it was all for naught". We received these same type of letters from Paramonovaya in Kaluga, N. Sidorovaya, V. Grishin and T. Nikitinaya in Moscow Oblast, N. Zhilin in Crimean Oblast and many others. How does one fight with those "promisers"?

[Answer] Unfortunately we have still not eliminated the cases such as you mention. But these are relatively few compared to the present amount of residential construction. This doesn't set one's mind at rest though. There are legal measures directed against what you called the "promisers". For example, a construction organization that has not eliminated construction defects within an established timeframe is fined a large sum of money for each day it delays and violators lose their bonus and are held strictly accountable. Financial agencies do not make final payment for work completion until defects have been totally eliminated.

For the sake of objectivity, we should note that construction work is a difficult process, not all of which depends on the builder. The problem of quality can be eliminated only by the combined efforts of all those participating in the construction process. And by the way, this was well put in a famous letter in PRAVDA.

But, and here the author of the letter was totally correct, the elimination of defects allowed during construction is not simply a responsibility. It is a matter of honor for those who build houses. In the majority of cases measures are taken the first time tenants request help.

[Question] But is it necessary to wait for the tenant to ask for help? Readers reasonably ask, "How can the state commission accept buildings with obvious defects? This is an act against one's conscience." By the way, not a single answer to complaints the editor sent to the appropriate organizations for investigation discussed what punishments are given to those who go against their principles and shut their eyes to defects.

[Answer] The appropriate USSR Council of Ministers' resolutions stipulate that residential and garage projects that have been completed can be put into use only after all work has been completed and defects have been eliminated.

Nonetheless there have been cases when buildings have been put into use with defects still intact.

We consider such facts as additions and eyewash and take very severe disciplinary and party measures against managers who allow them.

For example, two residential buildings with illegal finishing work were put into operation in the Transcaucasus Military District in the hopes of creating apparent well-being in the capital construction program for 1984. The chief of the district construction directorate, Colonel S. Chukhrov, was disciplined for this and the residential buildings were not counted in district plan completion calculations.

The former Transbaykal Military District deputy commander for construction and billeting, Colonel G. Pitalev, and the chiefs of the North Caucasus Military District construction and the billeting operations unit, officers P. Boyko and A. Gerasimenko, were found responsible both legally and to the party for not taking measures to eliminate violations in putting residential buildings into use.

And in the future we will increase our demands on those specific people who allow irresponsibility, poor economy and an anti-state approach to work. The April CPSU Central Committee Plenum vividly discussed the necessity of bringing the necessary order to every enterprise, every construction site and every organization. Without this we cannot get to the point where every individual works at his position with full efficiency.

The duty of military construction workers is to uphold their professional honor so that the fruits of their labor evoke a thankful response from new settlers.

Military Training Assignments Abused

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 85 p 2

[From the "After Appearing In KRSNAYA ZVEZDA" section]

[Text] Colonel S. Chernukha's letter published 28 February under the heading "Here Is A Sticky One" contained facts about several voyenkomats' formalistic attitude in selecting candidates for the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Automobile Engineer School imeni Chief Marshal of Armor Forces P. A. Rotmistrov. The editor received replies from the Kirghiz SSR military commissariat and from Poltava, Dzhizak and Samarkand oblvoienkomats [oblast voyenkomats] and also from military procurators in the Kiev and Central Asian Military Districts. These caused the procurator to check the facts indicated in the newspaper.

All the replies that were received reported that the facts were true. The letter was discussed at a meeting of military commanders and chiefs of oblast voyenkomat sections and voyenkomats of subordinate republics and it was the cause for serious discussion at a meeting of training institution directors, workers at the court and the procurator's office and also republican internal affairs agencies. The discussion took place because S. Altubayev, who had been made criminally answerable, had been sent to study at school and also because of other examples of a formalistic attitude toward selecting candidates for military training institutions. Chief of the Kirghiz political republican voyenkomat Colonel A. Savenko informed the editor about this.

Dzhizak Oblast Military Commissar Colonel A. Sattarov reports, "The facts about the careless attitude in formulating documentation for candidate O. Akhmetov were reviewed at an expanded session of the party obkom, the Komsomol obkom and the oblon [oblast department of public education]. Measures were taken to eliminate the possibility of such cases happening again. Class leader A. Pirmanov who is on the pedagogical council of School No 10 imeni V. I. Lenin was reprimanded for errors allowed in his work. Warrant Officer A. Berdibekov who is the one who formulated documents on candidates and cadets was also punished. Major V. Skvortsov, chairman of the rayon selection committee, was severely warned."

By order of the Poltava Oblast military commissar, Senior Lieutenant V. Yevdoshenko, deputy Orzhitskiy Rayon military commissar and the person who used the rayvoienkomat stamp to certify Komsomol references for candidate V. Gnishov, was given a disciplinary reprimand. The Samarkand oblvoienkomat published an order punishing Aktash gorvoienkomat section chief Major V. Osyk and Pakhtachiyskiy rayvoienkomat worker Warrant Officer V. Kan for their careless attitudes in making up documents for military school candidates

The editor also got an answer from Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee Secretary E. Muktarov. It reports, "The Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee has eliminated A. Sulaymanov from the ranks of the Komsomol and relieved him of his duty as Tokmakskiy Komsomol gorkom [town committee] First Secretary for violating Komsomol regulations, fraud and eyewash. Other gorkom workers and the secretaries of several of the city's local Komsomol organizations were held strictly responsible to the Komsomol. Republic Komsomol obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms were made aware that they had to have a stricter approach to problems of military and political education for young people, to training them for service in the Armed Forces and for making recommendations on personnel for military training institutions."

May Mailbag Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 85 p 2

["KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mail" section]

[Text] In May the editor received 13,430 letters, 373 of which were published. 710 responses to letters printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA were received.

May is over. It was the first month after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum whose decisions have stimulated new development in labor activity in the country. Soldiers in the Armed Forces have taken these decisions as a military program of activities. As evidenced by the letters to the editor, personnel see their duty as henceforth reliably guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the great accomplishments of Socialism.

In May the Soviet people and soldiers in the Army and Navy marked the celebration of International Worker Solidarity and the 40th Anniversary of Victory over the Fascists. Last month editorial mail included thousands of letters dedicated to those events.

Our memory of the war and the heroism of the Soviet people both on the front and in the rear area will not fade. Our readers share their impressions of a meeting with war veterans in the CPSU Central Committee, the 9 May 1985 military parade in Red Square and related many other events dedicated to the anniversary of the Great Victory. Ya. Korol from Kiev, V. Melikov from the Georgian SSR, Guards Warrant Officer I. Yanitskiy from the Baltic Military District, D. Lysakov from Bryansk and reserve Captain A. Aliyev from Azerbaijan SSR wrote on this topic.

For example, Lieutenant Colonel G. Pavlenko from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany reported that a delegation of war veterans visited there at the invitation of the GSVG [GSFG] military council. Heroes of the Soviet Union Colonel General B. Ivanov and Major General V. Zdunov, recipient of the Order of Glory former Sergeant Major L. Buzhak and other front line veterans visited the units where they had served. They again saw the military banners under which they had once gone into battle, got acquainted with the exhibits in

museums and Military Glory Rooms and told soldiers about what was behind the modest notes in unit historical service lists.

Many of our readers reported on the results of summer training, the completion of socialist commitments and the leading role of communists and Komsomol members in achieving high results in combat and political training. Captain N. Astashkin from the Far Eastern Military District wrote, "Officers Major A. Kosenkov, Senior Lieutenants I. Slezin and Yu. Sheykin completed the winter training period with high results in military work. Until recently Kosenkov and Sheykin had served in the company whose personnel roster will always include honored Red Army man Vladimir Ilich Lenin. This subunit is now commanded by Senior Lieutenant I. Slezin. The soldiers of that company again fulfilled the socialist obligations that they had made and for the twentieth time the company achieved the rank of "outstanding". Recently Major A. Kosenkov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and Senior Lieutenants I. Slezin and Yu. Sheykin received the medal "For Military Service".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mail proves that our readers have been very enthusiastic in taking measures to overcome hard drinking and alcoholism. Many letters state that the struggle against this abnormal phenomenon must take on a national character.

Many of the letters that arrived in May talked about preparations for the summer training period. Readers told about meetings of personnel outstanding in training, instructor methodological exercises and meetings and about preparing the material-technical training base. The idea that personnel in units and ships, avidly supporting the decisions of the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, are aflame with the desire to henceforth increase discipline and order, support high combat readiness and do everything to meet the 27th Party Congress in a worthy manner stands out in all of these letters. Colonel F. Peshkov and Major N. Mironov from the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant R. Bikmullin from the Carpathian Military District and Captain S. Markin with the Pacific Ocean Fleet specifically wrote about this.

As in previous months, May mail contained many letters which discussed the military service as a school of life and education and which told of the birth of a military dynasty. For example major G. Torzhok from the Belorussian Military District writes that in one of the aviation units the names of the Kharkevich warrant officers -- Ivan Grigoryevich Kharkevich and his children Ivan and Tatyana -- are covered with glory. Their names were recently counted among those of the best at a meeting of VVS district warrant officers. By the way, at that meeting the father was awarded the rank of senior warrant officer.

Reserve Personnel Actions Slowed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 85 p 2

[From "After Appearing In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] The correspondence from Colonel A. Drovosekov, published under the heading of "And Down It Goes" on 5 April, told about several officials'

bureaucratic attitude toward completing responsibilities associated with dismissing commissioned and army and navy warrant officers into the reserves and also about red tape and bureaucratism allowed by several voyenkomat workers when transmitting personnel files of reserve servicemen.

The answer signed by Vladimir oblvoynkom Major General S. Ryabov and chief of that voyenkomat's political section Colonel V. Belousov states that a check of the Aleksandrovskiy OGVK [Oblast G-unknown voyenkomat] revealed a gross violation in the way personnel files are being sent. The results of the inspection and the letter in the newspaper were discussed with officers in the oblast voyenkomats.

Section chief of the Aleksandrovskiy OGVK, Major Ye. Valuev, was given a severe reprimand for hindering the transmittal of Reserve Warrant Officer A. Khokhlov's personnel records. Aleksandrovskiy Military Commissar Lieutenant Colonel A. Zverev and chief of an oblast voyenkomat section Lieutenant Colonel A. Mashtakov were indicated as having to increase control over the work of their subordinates.

Major General A. Fedorov and Colonel V. Sherstyuk report to the editor that Lieutenant Colonel N. Radibov and Captain A. Shamanin were disciplined for being careless and for violating the established manner of transmitting the personnel records of Reserve Warrant Officer A. Khokhlov. The requirements for working up and transmitting personnel records of officers and warrant officers who have been released into the reserve were studied with commanders and chiefs of staffs from military construction detachments and workers from cadre agencies.

There were two answers forthcoming that covered the fact that the personnel records of Reserve Warrant Officer D. Nikiforov were erroneously sent to another voyenkomat and that there was red tape involved in sending them. Colonel V. Khlustsov and Lieutenant Colonel T. Kenzhin report that it wasn't B. Leonov who sent Nikiforov's personnel records to another voyenkomat as was stated in the correspondence, but B. Matyushenko. An order by the senior chief warned Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov that he must increase control over cadre agency workers subordinate to him and their timeliness and correctness in forwarding officer and warrant officer personnel records.

Another answer, signed by Deputy Moscow City Military Commissar Colonel V. Kushteyko, states that chief of the Kirovskiy section of the Moscow RVK [city military committee] Major S. Yermolayev was reprimanded for slowing up a request for the personnel records of Reserve Warrant Officer Nikiforov and for not knowing source documents. Kirovskiy rayon military commissar Colonel G. Chetverikov was also warned. The problems of bringing reservists in for military registration and removing them from the register was studied with personnel of the capital's rayvoynkomat.

Unfortunately the editor cannot report to the readers what has been done in regards to the newspaper article in the Central Asian Military District and what measures have been taken with the people guilty of causing Lieutenant S. Yurov, who was released into the reserves because of illness, to wait for the necessary documents for seven months. One must surmise that the district's

political directorate will remind the appropriate officials that they must respond to the newspaper article without prompting.

Spare Parts Squirreled

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 85 p 2

[From "After Appearing In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Colonel A. Drovosekov's and Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirokov's topical satire published under the heading "Redundancy in Damage" on 18 April told of above-norm supplies amassed in the warehouses of construction organizations and others in the Moscow PVO District and the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

Moscow PVO District Deputy Commander for Construction and Billeting Major General V. Orlov informed the editor that the facts presented in the satire were confirmed. The newspaper article was discussed with the district leadership and party activist in construction and billeting operations units and measures are being taken to detect above-norm and unused materials and put back them into the economic circulation. During a military council meeting district KECh, construction directorate and planning leaders were severely warned about deficiencies in planning and organizing construction work and in providing planning and budgeting documentation for projects under construction.

A reply signed by the chief of the construction directorate for the Moscow PVO District, Colonel G. Ponomarev, and the chief of the political section of that directorate, Colonel V. Zubrilov, stated that the newspaper article was discussed with section leaders and party and union activists from construction organizations, industrial enterprises and military construction organizations. Colonel A. Frolov was held responsible to the party for creating above-norm supplies.

Military procurator for the Moscow PVO District Major General of Justice V. Frolov informed the editor that an inspection was made into the satire. The deficiencies that were discussed in the satire were detected in a number of units in the district. The appropriate recommendation was given to the district deputy commander for construction and billeting.

Acting KECh commander for the city of Moscow Lieutenant Colonel V. Yermakov and partkom secretary Colonel V. Razin also responded to the newspaper article. They report that section chiefs were ordered to make an inspection for cases of excess equipment at construction projects.

Information sent to the editor by the military procurator of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Colonel of Justice V. Kaunin, stated that an inspection conducted by workers from the military procurator's office and from fleet support confirmed the facts contained in the satire. The fleet commander issued orders based on the inspection results. The chief of fleet automotive and armor services Colonel V. Alekseyev was reprimanded for poor control over his subordinates' work which led to the amassing of above-normative reserves of automotive spare parts. Lieutenant Colonel A. Aksenov, who had not determine actual spare

parts demand, was given a severe reprimand. The fleet support command is taking measures to redistribute excess spare parts and to put assets back into circulation.

Cadet Behavior Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Maksimov: "Detained While On City Pass"]

[Text] One can meet cadets from military training institutions on Leningrad's prospects and streets every day. And there are an especially large number of them on holidays and free days. It is pleasant to see how properly and honorably the majority of them conduct themselves while on a city pass. Well-composed, with a smart appearance and courteous behavior, with immaculate uniforms, they involuntarily arouse admiration among the inhabitants. And it is even more distressing when one meets among them a cadet with an untidy appearance and far from outstanding conduct. And unfortunately these cases do happen. For example, not long ago the military patrol had to interrupt the city pass of a cadet from the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, S. Maslennikov. He had appeared on the street looking as if he had just left the ship after an extended assault cruise -- in a baggy uniform and unshaven.

By the way, I was not entirely exact in my definition. The tradition of military sailors has always been to come ashore even after difficult cruises with an immaculate appearance, setting an example of neatness, good culture and discipline. But obviously not all cadets from the aforementioned school follow this good tradition. A month later this same Maslennikov was again stopped by a patrol detail. This time for being in the city without authorization.

"I decided to visit a female friend," he said, explaining his appearance in town without a hint of embarrassment.

And there it was. He decided and he left, right from an exercise. And it seems that no one rushed to find the cadet and no alarm was raised. The cadet's commander, Captain 2nd Rank V. Tomchak, who had gone to the commandant's office was unable to explain why his subordinate was absent without leave, as they say, in broad daylight right in front of his commanders. And he was not able to say anything intelligible about what measures would be taken to prevent such occurrences, those that we inform the school about every time. One again has to be convinced that people in this VUZ are responding in a formalistic manner to our signals. And in addition, the number of disciplinary violations done by its pupils is not falling, but instead is increasing.

And cadets from the Leningrad Higher School of Railroad Troops and Motor Transportation imeni M. V. Frunze are permitting a lot of violations when they are on pass. But the cadets of the Lomonosov Military Technical Aviation School hold this particular record.

A lot is being done in garrisons to uphold regulatory order and to have servicemen observe the rules of conduct while on a city pass. And we are trying to get future officers to set the example in this. For example, periodically there are times when the entire garrison meets with commanders of military training institutions. During these meetings they analyze reasons for shortcomings and also cases where cadets have displayed poor conduct in the city. But the number of violations is dropping extremely slowly. Obviously these meetings are not enough. What is needed is purposeful work with these very schools. But people in several of them are not responding to disciplinary violations in the necessary way. Even examples of cadets being stopped by the military patrol are not regarded as cadet disciplinary misdemeanors. And if one is to speak in major terms, this must be seen as an event. For the cadet subunit and the Komsomol organization. And for the entire school. And only then must the question be asked. And the topic is deviations from established norms that are allowed by a future officer, a person for whom high military culture must be an integral character trait. One has to regret that this is not being elevated to an indisputable rule in all schools.

Instructor Shortcomings Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 85 p 2

[From "After Appearing In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the critical correspondence from Kaliningrad garrison's military procurator Lieutenant Colonel of Justice D. Prudnikov under the heading "Eight Notes, Eight Times -- In The Mind" on 4 April.

As Navy Deputy Commander-in-chief for Naval Training Institutions and Chief of Naval Training Institutions Vice Admiral A. Kosov reported to the editor, the facts contained in the correspondence were true. By order of the school chief Lieutenant Colonel L. Stepin was warned about incomplete service compliance and the conduct of Captain A. Kravchenko was reviewed by a comrades court of officers' honor.

In addition, the school's party commission gave Lieutenant Colonel L. Stepin a severe warning and Captain A. Kravchenko was reprimanded with a notation on his registration card.

The school's deputy chief, Captain 1st Rank V. Grinchuk, was reprimanded for poor indoctrinational work with personnel and for insufficient control over the activities of the trainers and instructors of the physical training and sports faculty.

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 85 p 2

[From "After Appearing In KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Lieutenant Ye. Zamakhov's letter to the editor was published on 17 April under the heading "What To Fly In?" The author reported that several

pilots in the training regiment at the Orenburg Red Banner Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni I. S. Polbin were not fully equipped with special uniforms and this had an adverse effect on the quality of their work in the air.

As Air Force Deputy Commander-in-chief for Rear Services and the Chief of VVS Rear Services Colonel General A. Zakrevskiy reported to the editor, the facts were confirmed. This had happened because several officials in the school's clothing service were unable to organize and because the aviation regimental command had no control over the equipping of flight personnel. The chief of the VVS general staff required that control for the equipping of flight personnel be established to preclude such incidents.

The chief of the school, Major General of Aviation N. Kuchin, also reported on measures that were taken. Lieutenant Zamakhov and other officer pilots at the present time have been issued everything they require and those guilty parties have been punished. The chief of the unit's clothing service, Captain V. Alekseyenko, received a severe reprimand. The chief of the school's clothing service, Major V. Yefimov, was reprimanded for not having the necessary control and Colonel B. Bryansk and Major V. Borisov were given severe warnings. The newspaper article was discussed at a meeting of the command structure of the school and the units supplying it.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES, OCTOBER

Favoritism Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article "The Collapse of Protection"]

[Text] Under the title of "The Collapse of Protection" on 29 June 1985 an article was published by the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj V. Svetikov. It took up the unworthy actions of Capt 1st Rank G. Repashevskiy in placing his son in an institute. With his influence the son who had worked less than 6 months as a shore sailor and who had not undergone sufficient tempering and testing in labor, was accepted as a candidate party member. This showed a lack of principle on the part of the communists from the party organization of one of the subunits of the Hydrographic Service of the Black Sea Fleet as well as the party commission under the Political Section for the Special Units of the Sevastopol Garrison. G. Repashevskiy was also given willing support by certain workers from the Crimean Oblast Military Commissariat who deferred the draftee R. Repashevskiy from military service without any grounds. The article also raised the question of the responsibility of persons who submitted the recommendations for party membership.

The article "The Collapse of Protection" was discussed in the Navy Political Directorate, states Rear Adm Ya. Grechko. The given instance was a matter of serious discussion at a meeting of the leadership of the Navy political bodies, including with the secretaries of the party commissions. Measures were taken to strengthen control over the quality of party recruits.

In response to the newspaper's action received from the Political Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet and signed by Rear Adm S. Rybak, it states that the political worker of the Hydrographic Service, Capt 1st Rank V. Zhabin, was held responsible to the party. At present, he has been discharged into the reserves. Capt 1st Rank G. Repashevskiy was given a severe reprimand with the entry of this in his record.

The fact of giving a nonobjective recommendation for R. Repashevskiy for becoming a candidate member of the CPSU was examined by the Bureau of the Gagarinskiy Raykom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in Sevastopol. The former principal of School No 35 T. Rudik was expelled from the party, the

school instructor Ya. Chernysh and the former First Secretary of the Gagarinskiy Komsomol Raykom Yu. Krevskiy were strictly reprimanded.

Such a long time required to prepare this announcement following up our action is explained by the fact that certain groups were in no hurry to reply to the criticism. The appropriate officials from the Odessa Military District did not make any comment on the actions of the workers from the Crimean Oblast Military Commissariat. The editors quite recently received a reply just from the chief of the political section of the oblast military commissariat, Col A. Petrosyan who was also criticized in the article. His reply was an attempt to whitewash himself.

Description of Aruba Island

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by V. Viktorov: "The Island of Aruba"]

[Text] I recently read that the United States is planning to build a military base on the Island of Aruba. Please tell me what is this island and to whom does it belong?

N. Kozanchuk

The Netherlands Antilles are located in the Caribbean, to the north of Venezuela. They consist of six islands: Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao (from the group of Leeward Islands) and Saba, St. Eustatius and a portion of St. Martin Island (from the group of Windward Islands). Their total area is 1,011 km² and the population is 253,200 persons, basically negroes and mulattoes.

The Antilles Islands are a possession of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. They are a part of the kingdom and have autonomy in internal affairs. The questions of foreign policy and defense are in the hands of the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The governor is the personal representative of the queen of the Netherlands, as the head of the government of the Antilles Islands.

The Island of Aruba (area 190 km², population 59,000 persons) has long attracted the attention of U.S. military circles by its importance, in their opinion, strategic position. Hence, the attempts of the Pentagon to gain the approval of the Netherlands to establish a major naval and airbase on this island.

Illegal Activities in DOSAAF

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Secret of the 'Black Doctor'"]

[Text] This was the name of an article published on 27 October by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) Ye. Korovin and which took up serious shortcomings in the work of

the Sevastopol City DOSAAF Committee leading to the squandering of state money and sports equipment.

As the editors were informed by the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, Col Gen A. Odintsov, the facts given by the newspaper did occur. A. Voronin was discharged from his position as chairman of the DOSAAF Gorkom and taken off the given committee. By a decision of the Bureau of the Sevastopol Gorkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, he was reprimanded and this entered in his record.

The Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF drew the attention of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian DOSAAF to the superficial approach in inspecting the Sevastopol DOSAAF Gorkom in 1984 and issued instructions to institute order in the work of the departmental shops in the republic and strengthen control over the Crimean DOSAAF Obkom and the Sevastopol DOSAAF Gorkom.

Infringement of Officer Rights

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Is Such Replacement Necessary?"]

[Text] This was the title ["Is Such Replacement Necessary?"] of a letter to the editors by WOs [praporshchik] T. Kapusta, K. Yegorov, N. Ishchenko and others published on 4 September. The authors wrote that they had been assigned to duty roster instead of sergeants and soldiers and this impeded their performing of their direct duties and undermined the authority of the commander.

As the editors learned from the garrison judge advocate, Lt Col Just I. Karalupa, this fact was confirmed. The guilty party of the incorrect organization of the duty roster, Officer D. Dyduykin was given a judge advocate warning on the inadmissibility of violating the law. Proceedings have been instituted for disciplinary action against him. Maj Gen Avn V. POdeynek has stated that Officer Dyduykin has been strictly warned against the inadmissibility of similar actions in the future. His illegal decision has been nullified.

Misuse of De-icer Alcohol

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Article and editorial response: "By Fictitious Papers"]

[Text] On 3 February 1982, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Col A. Sorokin under the title "Who Is Being Warned by the De-icer?" This dealt with the illegal consumption of alcohol in one of the air units of the Kiev Military District and the improper use of it by officials.

The article was widely discussed and caused many responses and official replies. One of them stated that the Air

Forces command and political section in the district had taken specific measures to prevent something similar in the future.

But now, 3 1/2 years later, the editors' mail has brought a new letter from the Kiev Military District. The subject is the previous one: alcohol "freezes" to...others' fingers.

At present, we are publishing this letter with a commentary by our correspondent.

Respected editors! The aircraft technician, Sr Lt V. Kuraksin, is writing to you. The question is that in our squadron the de-icing fluid, more precisely ethyl alcohol or rectificate, which should be provided for the aircraft is often in fact not provided but is written off and consumed by individuals. When I began to load the obtained alcohol into the aircraft as was required, I heard numerous complaints from the squadron commander.

Once I refused to sign fictitious papers for writing off alcohol and said that I would not sign them in the future. Soon thereafter I felt a "special" attitude toward me with complaints arising over my service and which previously did not exist. Recently Maj V. Ilyashenko, the acting squadron engineer, reprimanded me for "obstreperousness," although I was merely defending my viewpoint on the illegal writing off of the de-icer.

I myself take a very negative view of alcoholic beverages but am suffering precisely...because of alcohol. There are "well wishers" who advise me: "Better be quiet and things will go better." I have not paid attention to such "advice," although there is a grain of truth in it.

I entered military school with one dream of serving the motherland. I endeavor to perform my duty honorably. But I cannot remain indifferent when I see that harm is being caused to flight safety. The alcohol is "sticking" to some fingers, I am trying to combat the violation but I am punished for this.

Sr Lt V. Kuraksin, Aircraft Technician

Commentary of Correspondent. The facts set out in the letter of Sr Lt V. Kuraksin have been confirmed. Moreover, it turned out that 2 years previously the question was raised in the squadron of the illegal writing off and consumption of alcohol. As a result, certain officers, including Maj V. Ilyashenko, were reduced in rank and the losses suffered by the state were compensated for. But, as can be seen, the proper conclusions were not drawn.

The acting squadron commander Capt V. Gradusov and the flight commander Maj I. Teplyakov have described Sr Lt Kuraksin as a conscientious, industrious officer, an intelligent specialist and an honest and principled person. One wonders why in all of this Kuraksin has not been understood and supported by the squadron commander, Lt Col N. Svezhentsev, his deputy for the aviation engineer service Maj V. Nikulinskiy and certain other officials.

In talking with the correspondent all officers present from the squadron technical personnel expressed dissatisfaction that they had to sign fictitious papers for the expenditure of alcohol. And Capt V. Matyushev stated directly: "I am fed up with this fuss about the de-icer. It would be much easier to work without it."

However, the alcohol is indispensable. It can be needed by an air fighter at any minute when a critical situation could arise threatening flight safety. Its embezzlement or use for personal selfish aims are primarily the undermining of squadron and regiment combat readiness. Certainly this must be understood in the squadron?

Lt Col A. Vasilets, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent

Shoddy Work in Military Construction

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Soviet Army employee M. Kakhanovskikh: "I Do Not Want To Work Full Strength..."]

[Text] Dear Editors! At present, everywhere in the nation, as they say, from one end to the other there is a move to instill proper order in production and everyday life. I am a nonparty person but support this party line with my whole heart. I am confident that we will achieve success and it is merely a question, as Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized, for each of us to be permeated with a spirit of personal responsibility for the common concern, each of us from the worker to the minister.

Changes, pleasing shifts for the better can be seen more and more frequently. In our military-construction organization as of yet they are merely saying fine words and are in no hurry to reinforce them with specific deeds. Let me give a sampling from my own work superintendent diary and you can judge for yourselves.

"23 May. I took over the documents for the site. From 24 through 28 May, we agreed upon the water line route. On 30 May we did not work because there was no machinery and crane, although they promised to provide them."

I could continue this unhappy list of facts of indifference and mismanagement. Month after month passes but nothing changes. Each day we must phone up, demand and "shake things out." One wonders how they can snarl up such an important question of promptly supplying the construction site with materials and equipment.

Once, as they say, I was on the phone for hours: where were the promised slabs? "Oh, we are sick and tired of you, Marya Ivanna," the supply workers told me but they finally found the slabs. And where do you think they were? A good hundred kilometers from our project! Just imagine how much time and fuel went up in smoke until they were delivered. But in our UNR [office of work superintendent] these facts are not considered and even now are

tolerated. This does not prevent our leaders from talking about the importance of strict economy and thriftiness on the job.

But these correct words quite often differ from reality. Let me give the following case. The military construction workers and civilian workers at our section use an amenities room which has long been written off. But the promised new one still has not come. I began to investigate but could not make anything out. It turns out that no one has kept track of the service trailers and no one knows which are where: Are they at a construction site, under repair or have they been sold to private individuals? Nor do we know the fate of a motor from a welding unit.

Of course, I did not keep quiet, I spoke out at meetings and wrote to superior levels. There they heard me out and largely agreed with me. For example, in May the chief of the political section, Maj Gen B. Shkibtan promised that they would study the cases of writing off and selling the service trailers for taking the corresponding measures, but up to now everything remains as it was. But for me I fell out of favor.

"What sort of person are you, Marya Ivanovna," said a leader. "Always out of sorts. And look at your wages! We certainly did not insult you."

Evidently the only thing in the world is money. But I want first of all to work at full strength and my conscious does not allow me to tolerate inefficiency.

At present, as is known, in construction the problem of problems is incomplete work. In other words, they start something before finishing something else. And such shuffling has become a system. And it is producing its own lamentable fruits as people lose interest in the end result. Hence the indifference and lamentable complacency for the common concern. And then the human factor falls silent.

There is a lot of this indifference to the job, as well as formalism. Once we received some new shovels but their handles were so curved that it was impossible to use them. I took a shovel and went off to the chief of the superior construction organization, Col A. Semenov. I knew that he was not to blame for the useless tool being made somewhere. But those who supplied us could not help but see that it was unusable for work.

I asked the chief: "Could you dig a pit with such a shovel?" "We will straighten out the handle," he replied. "This is merely a detail."

Anyone who worked at the site knew that it was not a detail. This question conceals official incompetence and an irresponsible attitude toward the assigned job. In adding up one by one, they create a mood of laxness and take away people's willingness to work at full strength. And this involves major losses which are not only material but also moral and psychological.

The military construction workers are young people. A majority of them possibly is establishing a basis of convictions, an activist position in life and labor and human maturity precisely here at the construction site. Having

served 2 years, they fill out the ranks of the working class and assume the concerns of the nation's future. How important it is that from their very first steps in independent life they be surrounded by a situation of respect for labor, justness and careful management.... What lessons will they learn if they see that orders are often not carried out correctly and on time and bonuses are paid without merit. Here it is October and they still have not completed the August work schedule.

After this how can the military construction workers be looked in the eye? Certainly they understand everything. Once we earned 33 rubles in bonuses. I congratulated my fellows but evidently was in a hurry. For some reason our bonus was given...to others.

Here is also something that bothers me. At one time I actively submitted innovation proposals. And it seemed to some that Kakhanovskikh had begun to earn a lot of money. Initially I could not figure it out: my proposals were not "going anywhere" and it was enough to make you cry. Then I received a note from my former chief of the section, Officer V. Zuyev. "M. I.! Phone me tomorrow morning. You must get a bottle of cognac to Zalybin (I told you). Otherwise he will not give a 'good' for the rationalization proposal." This meant that you had to "pay respects" to Comrade Zalybin for him to do what he should.

Of course, we have many honest workers who are concerned for the job. It is all the more lamentable that the desire to improve things and instill order is not always supported. Such things should not exist, particularly now. Not everyone, unfortunately, has realized this as quickly as one would like. Recently, a correspondent from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA visited our construction site to check the facts which I had written about to the editors. As soon as he had left, I was summoned by the UNR chief, Lt Col V. Dimitriyev. Our talk lasted 3 1/2 hours. He ended the difficult conversation with me with the words: "Put in your request to leave and I will sign it." To be honest, I wondered if it wouldn't be better to do this right away.... But later I decided that I would not. All of this is not just my personal concern but rather our common one. And I sent off this letter to the editors.

Improper Assignment of Reserve Officer

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Shuffling Assignments..."]

[Text] On 5 September the letter of Lt A. Sonko was published under this title ["Shuffling of Assignments"]. It recounted instances of an indifferent attitude by the command of the UNR [section of work superintendent] and the military construction detachment to the development of a reserve officer called up for 2 years of active service.

The editors have received a reply over the signature of the chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Section and deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Fleet, Capt 1st Rank V. Sivogrov. It stated that the

newspaper publication has been examined in the fleet's political directorate. The facts set out in it were confirmed in a check.

The commander of the military construction detachment Lt Col V. Rodygin and the chief of staff of the detachment Capt A. Lukyanov were strictly reprimanded for the violation of prescribed discipline. Lt A. Sonko received back the money withheld from him totaling 289 rubles and 72 kopecks. He was also reimbursed for his travel expenses to courses in the city of Severomorsk and back.

The chief of the personnel section of the fleet construction directorate Lt Col R. Lutsak was strictly reprimanded for poor control over implementing on the spot the orders to assign officers called up from the reserves to their positions.

Improper Officer Conduct Reprimanded

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Authority of a Leader"]

[Text] This ["The Authority of a Leader"] was the title of an article published on 27 June. It gave instances of a disrespectful attitude to subordinates on the part of certain officers of the military-construction units.

The editors have received a reply from the acting chief of the political section of the military-construction organization, Col G. Maslyuk. It states that for the abuse of official position and unworthy conduct the deputy commander for supplies of the military-construction detachment Maj G. Kudryashov has been expelled from the ranks of the CPSU. The deputy detachment commander for political affairs Maj S. Golev and the chief of staff Capt A. Sinitskiy have been severely cautioned.

In the political section they heard the chief of the UNR Col I. Khaleyev and measures were taken to eliminate the shortcomings pointed out in the newspaper publication.

The political workers, Officers I. Ivanshin and A. Trishchenko were strictly reprimanded for not responding promptly to the critical comments of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

However, regardless of a reminder, no reply has been received from the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasian Military District.

Wastefulness in Tank Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 85 p 2

[Letter to the editors by Lt Col Yu. Beleko of the Northern Group of Forces: "Races at the Tank Driving Grounds"]

[Text] Dear Editors! I feel that the problem which I have raised in my letter concerns not only our unit. The question is this. How much energy and effort we spend at times on saving fuels and lubricants. In our tank unit, for example, the subunit commanders constantly make certain that on each combat vehicle the main clutch, the epicyclic steering unit and the high-pressure fuel pump are properly adjusted. These measures alone provide a tangible savings of diesel fuel.

The men work and work but all their efforts are frequently nullified. I would like to point out who is to blame. Let me illustrate this by an example. The tank company commanded by Capt A. Khromenkov in a month saved around 100 kg of diesel fuel. But then tactical exercises with field firing started. And at the initial stage the tank troops made many errors. These errors started when they left the park area. And these led to a situation where the idling tank engines "consumed" all the saved fuel. This was the price paid by the poor preparation of the personnel for the field trip.

It has become a rule for us of not to return from the firing range, from the moving target gunnery range or from any field trip until the subunit's actions have a grade of "good" as a minimum. This is how it should be. But how do certain commanders proceed in this? Instead of careful, painstaking work aimed at instilling strong practical skills in the tank troops, they become involved in coaching and drive the tanks senselessly hither and thither over the driving range, they burn up fuel and consume extra ammunition and motor life. Is this not wastefulness?

We say a good deal about skill. But what? At times we link this noble concept with a certain moment or action (for example, he acted skillfully in a critical moment). But skill is a specific concept which characterizes a person's nature and the character of the entire troop collective. For example, we are all confident that the subordinates of Sr Lt A. Zakharzhevskiy will show skill in any question. Even in thriftiness. The company in an incomplete training period saved 642 kg of diesel fuel. Here 65 percent of the men have a high class rating. All the tactical and gunnery tasks are first worked out by the tank troops in the training classrooms and simulators. Then their actions in the exercises are always well thought out and effective.

Thriftiness is closely tied to the high skills of the specialists and their excellent training. This is a well known truth. It is time that this is understood by my fellow servicemen Capt A. Khromenkov and Sr Lts B. Blesnov and V. Dudchik. In my opinion, routine has gotten them down. At present, the comrades are living by old standards. They continue to reason: let's just get to the field and work out all the questions there. Training time is merely wasted in the classroom. Let me recall that such psychology has already brought down the company commander, Capt A. Khromenkov.

Housing Construction Flaws

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Again Just Promises...."]

[Text] The letter of N. Putova, N. Bykanova and others was published under this title]"Again Just Promises...."] on 1 September. It took up substantial shortcomings in the turning over of a residential building erected by the construction organization led by Lt Col V. Astakhov and of red tape in eliminating construction flaws.

The First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Siberian Military District Maj Gen S. Izmalkin has informed us that the article was discussed at meetings for all categories of command personnel and with the party and Komsomol aktiv. A special commission inspected all the apartments. The flaws in them were eliminated.

For poor quality construction of the building, disciplinary procedures have been instituted against 10 persons, including the chief engineer of the district Construction Directorate Col A. Zelenyy, the chief of the construction organization Lt Col V. Astakhov, the chief of the UNR Lt Col V. Gritsenko and the section chief, Soviet Army employee V. Zurkov. A number of communists have been criticized by the party. For official oversights and personal lack of discipline the company commander Sr Lt I. Gurin was expelled from the CPSU. A strict reprimand was given to the CPSU member, Lt Col V. Gritsenko and a reprimand to the secretary of the UNR party committee, Soviet Army employee Yu. Ikryanov.

In response to the newspaper's article and signed by the district chief of the construction administration Col I. Kozelkov and the chief of the political section Col Ya. Murakhovskiy, it states that specific measures have also been taken to raise the personal responsibility of officials for ensuring high-quality construction.

Indoctrinational Shortcomings Criticized

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Costs of 'Cabin' Style"]

[Text] This was the title ["The Costs of 'Cabin' Style"] of a critical article published on 11 June. It described serious shortcomings in indoctrination and in organizing the socialist competition and permitted by officers of the ship on which Capt 3d Rank V. Goncharuk serves. As the editors were informed by Rear Adm V. Gokinayev, the facts given in the article were confirmed. This was discussed with the ship commanders and political workers. For serious omissions in service Capt 3d Rank V. Goncharuk was discharged into the reserves. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against a number of officers. Capt Lt V. Karlyakov was called up before his party group.

Red Tape Delays Transfer

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 85 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Red Tape"]

[Text] This was the title ["Red Tape"] of a letter to the editors from Maj G. Kurnosov published on 29 August. The author related that for a long time there had been continuing red tape with the transfer of his personal file and because of this he could not be assigned to a position at his new post.

As Col P. Novikov from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSVG] informed the editors, this fact was confirmed. A strict reprimand was made against Lt Col G. Gubke who was guilty of inefficiency and poor supervision. The officer's personal file has been sent from the GSVG and received in the Carpathian Military District.

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CSO: 1801/49

ARMED FORCES

CONCERN FOR MILITARY FAMILIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by G. Konyushkova, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "By Itself -- An Official Trip Because Of An Disquieting Letter"]

[Text] There is the popular expression, "The State is made strong by the family." It is very likely that these words are especially true when applied to the families of those people who wear the military uniform and whose profession is guarding the State. People who have devoted themselves to their military labor are carrying out their difficult duty inside the Polar Circle and in the burning sands, in the tundra's wilderness and on the oceans' expanses. And along with them are their families. These families are the rear area for a military man.

In their letters to the editor and at numerous meetings with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA workers, our readers are expressing the desire to have the newspaper publish more material about the families of servicemen, their problems, concerns and needs and so the editor is meeting these desires. Materials on these topics will be published under the rubrics "In Our Families", "At The Daily Crossroads", "The Problems Of Young Families", "A Commentary On Psychology" and others.

Today's selection is devoted to the problems of large families,. This topic was raised in correspondence from B. Kogan (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 August)

Judging from Tatyana Pludovskaya's letter which was written in response to a newspaper article, the trip to Leningrad did not promise to be pleasant. Earlier I had imagined how the young officer's family was alone in the big city and how the distresses and offenses had overwhelm them. After finding Barochnaya Ulitsa on the Petrograd side, I went up the steep, dark stairway toward the very roof. In the communal room the door from the kitchen led into a small ten-square meter room where the Pludovskiys lived. Tatyana Aleksandrovna was embarrassed and confused by the appearance of a correspondent. Just the opposite, nine-month old Natasha, who was sitting on the bed, examined this unknown person with interest.

The Pludovskiy's have three other children besides Natasha. Two-year old Mishutka, shifting from side to side in an amusing way, like a sailor on deck, brought me the mop and dust-pan in a business-like manner, as if to say the time for putting things in order has arrived. "Please sit down," said six-year old Veronika, "Nika" as she is called at home, offering me a chair, and she immediately took the mop away from the little one. "Mama already cleaned everything. Do you see how the floor shines?" And the little one, not knowing how to entertain guest happy for a while, offered me half a cutlet with bread.

I involuntarily remembered children from whom you often hear "Give me!" and "It's mine!" at this age. Could it be true that it is easier to educate children when there are a lot of them? That they educate themselves collectively. And if, when Nika arrives from kindergarten, he asks if mama's leg hurts, then Mishutka, still articulating the words poorly, begins to mutter something affectionate and starts blowing on mama's leg.

Maxim Gorkiy said, "Loving children in something a chicken can do. But the ability to educate them -- this is major state business." It is state business because the future of the nation is in the hands of mothers.

Tatyana Aleksandrovna Pludovskaya's hands are worker's hands, strong and kind. They are also accustomed to tenderly holding an infant and washing diapers. They adroitly wash the floor and use a broom. These are the hands of a woman who does not avoid work. And when you see that both Nika and her sons are trying to imitate her -- one washes the dishes, another dries and the third carries them to the small cabinet -- you understand that this is all her doing and her education. She recalls a sunny day at the stadium. The whole family had gone and the children didn't get a step away from their father. Viktor Yevgenyevich began to teach them to run properly on the cinder track. Nika and Serezha darted along behind their father. Mishutka was barely one year old and he still walked in an uncertain manner. He got on his hands and knees and quickly minced after his elders.

While Tatyana Aleksandrovna was relating this story, her face was tender and happy. And then a cloud passed over it. She certainly had enough to worry about. Her husband comes home late and there are times when he is absent for days. Tatyana Aleksandrovna does not complain about this, for she understands that a man in the military is not free to arrange his time as he might like. She does not say that she needs help, although even I see that she does. She has thrombophlebitis which not long ago became aggravated and she was not even able to take the children to the small garden. And she had no place to leave the smallest, as there was still no opening in the day nursery. Neighbors have helped her, but you can't keep asking and asking.

I asked, "And what about an apartment? Have they put you on the register again?"

When the fourth child, Natasha, was born, Tatyana Aleksandrovna Pludovskaya was put on the Petrograd Council of People's Deputies Ispolkom register for improved living conditions. This was natural, because the state is concerned

about large families. She was soon offered an apartment, but Tatyana Aleksandrovna refused it. It was not that the apartment was in bad shape or that it was small. It was something else that frightened her off. First, the apartment was in a remote area and it would take her husband almost four hours to get to his unit. Secondly, it was on the thirteenth floor. It wasn't that thirteen is an unlucky number, for people in these times don't believe in such omens. It was simply that she feared the elevator might suddenly stop operating and she would not be able to walk up the stairs with the small children as well as with bags. And she has the bad leg as well! And it is no secret that there are problems with stores, domestic enterprises and the market in the new area.

A little later she was offered another apartment. This one also required that her husband travel a long way, but they decided to resign themselves to this.

Time went by and the time for accepting the order was upon them. The closer it came, the more upset Tatyana Aleksandrovna became. Finally, on one of those evenings when her husband was on duty, she took a clean piece of paper and wrote a statement refusing the apartment that had been offered. She wrote it and started to cry.

No, this wasn't a matter of being fastidious. The apartment came with built-in furniture and what could be better! But they had no money to pay for it and they would not deliver the order without the money.

Certainly delicate financial issues must be faced. Children require a financial outlay, an not a small one at that. It would certainly help to have grandmothers and grandfathers who are secure and who are ready to provide assistance, but if this is not available?

Several days later the Pludovskiys received an official letter that stated, "You are required to pay for the furniture and to accept the order. If not, you will be removed from the register."

We went along with a unit representative, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Gusev, to visit the department that handled the registry and the distribution of living space for the Petrograd Rayon Council of People's Deputies. The department manager, Lyubov Vasilyevna Klocheva, who had worked there for many years, received us properly and politely. A case with previously prepared documents for apartment tenant Pludovskaya, the mother of four children, was already on her desk and she began a prepared speech with, "Did you know that she has already refused two apartments?"

Yes, she refused them. Only Klocheva didn't know why this had happened. We had to explain everything in a purely womanly manner.

I asked why Pludovskaya had been barred from the residential register and found out that no one had barred her. It was simply decided that when the decision was made to allot the apartment to this large family, Pludovskaya was mechanically left off the register. But then how do you accept the official note that was cited above and that was signed by this same L. Klocheva? And

how do you take the fact that no one even wanted to respond to Pludovskaya's recent request that she not be removed from the register?

We have excellent laws in this country to protect motherhood and they elevate concern for large families to the level of state policy. But, sometimes, to our great dismay, the people on whom the execution of these laws depend display a cold heart and callous spirit. Take that same shop where the Pludovskiys were registered. The Pludovskiys were forced to refuse an order several times when the store added an expensive box of sweets and champagne to the order before a holiday. The Pludovskiys were really not at the champagne level.

When Pludovskaya told me how neighbors sometimes helped her manage with the children, I could not hold back and I asked, "But what about the women's council in the unit where your husband serves?"

"What women's council?" she answered questioningly.

Senior Lieutenant Pludovskiy is a very modest man. I would suggest that he was simply ashamed to turn to anyone with his worries. And no one was interested in how he lived and what problems he was going through.

The women's council representative, Galina Sergeyevna Rulinskaya, with whom I had a conversation about large families again asked with amazement, "The senior lieutenant has four children?" and shrugged her shoulders. She had not heard.

And I was surprised by her ignorance. People active in the women's council always know when and to whom children are born. In many garrisons it has become a tradition to solemnly honor the parents of a new baby, to give flowers and possibly a gift, in honor of this event. True, the Pludovskiys live in Leningrad and the unit's women's council considers only those who live in the garrison itself as its members. But everyone does not have the opportunity of living in the garrison, so what you get is, "our people" and "those that aren't." If people are one of "those that aren't", the council doesn't know what is going on with them and doesn't know their concerns. They have their concerns and the council has its.

And this applies to more than just the community. Only recently has the young officer's predicament reached the commander and his assistant for political affairs. And yet it is this predicament that dictates the officer's frame of mind in the service and the quality of his service.

This is a sad history which, one wants to hope, ends favorably. It simply cannot end any other way, because the state will not allow that.

By the way, the Pludovskiys are now awaiting a fifth child.

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CSO: 1801/51

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

POOR MAINTENANCE OFFICIALS ATTITUDE CITED--"Annoying Losses" was the title of a letter sent to the editor that was published 7 February. It brought up facts about some officials' irresponsible attitude toward setting up and providing repair service to several Northern Fleet ships. Vice-Admiral V. Barannik informed the editor that Captain 2nd Rank Ye. Volkov was removed from his position and demoted, and Captain 3rd Rank V. Khromchenko was dismissed into the reserves for their irresponsibility. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 85 p 2] 8936

CSO:1801/249

GROUND FORCES

TRAINING METHODS AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 9, Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Warrant Officer S. Geraskin, Chemical Instructor, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The 'Enemy' Has Used Toxic Agents"]

[Text] In its time the Directorate of the Chief of Chemical Forces for the USSR Ministry of Defense developed a method for conducting exercises in ZOMP [Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction] that is integrated with tactical, marksmanship, engineer and military-medical training. The foremost subunits have already accumulated experience in using this integrated training. Chemical instructor Warrant Officer S. Geraskin tells about the methodological features of this integrated exercise

Tactical training is the heart of field training for troops and therefore we examined the development of several ZOMP issues during an exercise on the theme "The Squad in the Attack". This is precisely where the squad learns how to operate in modern battle.

A tactical-firing exercise is the the best place for integrated work. It gives sergeants the opportunity of training the squad first individually and then all together in the techniques of completing both individual movements and then operations involving missions and norms.

It is precisely this method that one of the best motorized rifle squad commanders, Sergeant Yu. Pototskiy, uses in the field. Operating in an armored transport as part of a platoon, his subordinates had to kick a defending "enemy" off of an important line.

As usual, in the form-up area soldiers sized up the missions for the battle and worked on combat engineer support for the area. But, as opposed to earlier field goals, in an integrated exercise one training goal is an integral part of another. Pototskiy required that the soldiers have a thorough knowledge foundation for the measures that they carried out. For example, why does a BTR [armored personnel carrier] have to be camouflaged

with a layer of earth to a thickness of half a meter? Isn't a ten-centimeter embankment enough?

BTR driver Private Yu. Leshko had to recall and report on the destructive properties of toxic agents and the means for protecting against them. What came out was that a thin layer of soil would protect a combat vehicle from liquid OV [toxic agent] drops, but it would not protect against aerosols. The tactical exercise scenario exercise did not preclude the "enemy's" use of either type, which meant that foreseeing the danger required that everything be done so as not to subject with personnel or equipment to the effects of OV.

For the sake of the tactics used to carry out the assigned missions, Sergeant Pototskiy conducted a question and answer session to test the soldiers' knowledge of notification signals and the rules for operating upon receipt of them. Since the "enemy" could use OV at any stage of the battle, the squad commander trained his motorized rifle men to don individual protective gear and reminded them of the need to strictly observe intervals and conduct constant reconnaissance.

It is certainly important to teach subordinates how to protect themselves against OV. Yet this is not done simply for their self-protection, but rather to complete the mission -- to knock the "enemy" off of his defensive line under the active influence of toxic agents.

Foreseeing that under these conditions the tempo of the attack and the fire effects on the "enemy" would be somewhat reduced, after studying the terrain Sergeant Pototskiy moved his subordinates' dismount line closer to the forward line of the enemy's defense and set up the firing sectors from the BTR so that every sector could be covered by the duplicating fire of two men. Thus Pototskiy countered the opposing side's plan to use the effects of OV to slow the attackers and reduce their fire activity by tactical ingenuity based on solid knowledge of regulatory requirements, the marksmanship course and the probable enemy's OV characteristics.

The methodology of an integrated exercise envisions the development of protective means against OV integrated into the dynamics of battle. Pototskiy acted correctly when the hypothetical situation "enemy aviation is making a chemical bombing run on the attackers" was introduced at the point where his squad was deploying on the target.

By the hollow sound of the burst (a training simulator smoke grenade ((IDG)) was dropped a significant distance away) the trainees knew that a large caliber bomb that was as a rule filled with combined poisonous materials, either cyanogen chloride or cyanide, had been dropped. The motorized rifle men knew from previous exercises that the all-force gas mask was protection against this and other OV. Therefore when the command "gas" resounded, every soldier was prepared and carried the order out within the allotted time.

Without stopping its observation, the squad rushed forward. The "enemy's" fire effect increased, but as had been established at the form-up area, the

motorized riflemen supported each other in detecting targets and confidently suppressed them.

During the attack another hypothetical situation was introduced: machine-gunner Private S. Salakhov had a partially damaged gas mask and riflemen Privates K. Resh and N. Yurevich had gas masks that were totally inoperable. Salakhov reacted properly. He removed the "damaged" hose and connected the cannister directly to the gas mask. Resh and Yurevich were unable to come up with the proper responses and considered themselves out of action.

After ordering a specific stand-down, the squad commander explained what the trainees' error had been. Cyanogen chloride and cyanide were both liquids that evaporated quickly. In open terrain such as the motorized rifle men were operating in, they evaporated in 10-15 minutes and had no effect on metals and clothing. Enough time had elapsed since the explosion so that the OV concentration in the atmosphere was insignificant and the evening wind assisted in this evaporation. In order to convince the soldiers that the attack could continue, the sergeant ordered that the OV concentration in the air be measured using a VPKhR [military chemical reconnaissance instrument] detector tube. The concentration was less than 0.01 milligrams per liter and from previous exercises the soldiers knew that they could remain in the contaminated zone without masks for an hour with this insignificant dose. This meant that they did not have to stop the attack and was a good lesson not only for Resh and Yurevich, but for all the soldiers in the squad.

While explaining the specific characteristics of other groups of toxic agents, Pototskiy stressed that there were many methods for reliably defending against any "enemy" chemical action and therefore it was possible to carry out the assigned mission.

For example, Private Yu. Nesterov was ordered while wearing a protective suit to take up a firing position in terrain that was contaminated with persistent OV. Knowing the effect that terrain and weather conditions had on the state and dispersal depth of OV vapors, the soldier did not stop to find a ravine or to camouflage himself in tall grass, but took up a comfortable firing position on a hard, stoney out-jut. He knew that the poisonous materials had evaporated and were blown away much faster at this location.

Partial poisonings are possible on the battlefield. Privates N. Noskov and B. Boreyko, under the sergeant's guidance, demonstrated the proper manner for rendering self-aid and first aid. Everyone's attention was focused on how to use the contents of the individual anti-chemical packet (IPP). The use of visual methods was especially valuable, since at later stages of the exercise the motorized riflemen had to operate in all-force protective suits, take antidotes to maintain combat effectiveness and undergo partial decontamination of their skin and weapons.

During the development of the theme "Squad In The Attack, Sergeant Pototskiy succeeded in reaching yet another indicator important for battle. Thanks to the integrated training method, every motorized rifleman experienced a prolonged stay in his gas mask. The skills that they acquired and the physical hardening in conjunction with the increased moral-psychological

qualities allowed the soldiers to successfully carry out the assigned missions at tactical training.

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CSO: 1801/54

GROUND FORCES

UNECONOMIC USE OF TANK TRAINING RESOURCES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Omelchenko, senior officer for the Red Banner Turkestan Military District's Military Training Directorate and Colonel G. Ivanov, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Expenditures And Results"]

[Text] The tank training battalion commanded by S. Samsonov was checking the marksmanship training of future tank commanders. Following tradition, company commander Senior Lieutenant S. Malyutin and platoon commander Senior Lieutenant I. Bushuyev began the firing. They displayed good professional skills and hit all targets.

One would think that their subordinates would also fire this accurately. However, during the next round of firing Private A. Nikitin received an unsatisfactory grade. And several other soldiers fired no better. In short, Senior Lieutenant Bushuyev's platoon was sub-par.

This scene was also repeated in many respects at night when the platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Trembak took the examination. The examiners had to stop the exercise so as not to expend fuel and ammunition in vain. A more extensive examination of the future tank commanders indicated that many of them did not really know the fundamentals of firing very well.

And, judging by military training records, these platoons had completed their training plan for tank firing and for marksmanship. It is only a question of how well they had trained and the marksmanship results speak for themselves.

And there is one thing that must be brought out in reviewing the fact that the plan had been completed. That is that the subunit was able to eliminate several of the training deficiencies that had been detected during the examination by only one additional training session that the battalion commander held at the moving target firing range

As familiarity with the subunit's material-technical training base has shown, they have the resources for their personnel to get high marksmanship training grades. Take simulator equipment, for example. The battalion has enough of this equipment, but effective training resources have not been utilized as they should have been. A prime example is the fact that film-simulators for

loaders have stood unused for two years because they were delivered to the unit without the appropriate technical manuals and without several components.

There must be someone in the subunit who was enraged when he saw how this equipment that had stood here so long was rusting? There certainly are and one such was Captain S. Pavlov who at one time told the commander that he was ready to put the trainer into operation. But in order to do that he had to see how its "twins" in neighboring units were operating. Other units promised to cooperate with the enthusiast, but nothing went further than promises.

And other electronic equipment designed to train specialists is also being used improperly. For example, devices for developing aiming skills are constantly not operational because of dampness in the building. And as it turned out during the evaluation, not one of the four simulators in the artillery training school had operational stabilizers and the night sights had not been repaired.

Many of the future tank driver-mechanics also demonstrated poor training levels during the review exercises. In the opinion of Major V. Listov, an expert in the armor branch, one of the reasons for this was that they don't work enough. And this officer explained it by the shortage of ... simulators.

Thus one is given with this strange picture. On the one hand, people complain about a shortage of simulators and on the other hand, these same simulators stand idle. No, obviously the primary reason for poor specialist training in the training subunit is that military training is not organized clearly enough and that several officials don't feel enough responsibility for insuring that training plans are met in a complete and qualitative manner.

All of this is in no way tied to those calls for economy and thrift which can be seen on the colorfully formulated stands that have been set up in the battalion area. It appears that the struggle for economy is being waged only with words here. For example, the unit's collective socialist commitments are being kept in the safe of Captain M. Ibrayev, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs and these commitments include this point: "To save three percent of the established limit on fuel and lubricants." But people in the subunit were unable to give an answer as to how the tankers planned to meet their promise. And the fact that the majority of the soldiers did not include this point in their individual commitments is unacceptable. And those who did commit themselves to this do not know how much they have saved. There were no calculations made and there was no competition for economy and thrift. Thus the tankers' scornful attitude toward simulators, equipment that, as is well known, provides a lot of savings, becomes understandable.

And the fact that the field maintenance park, where the training vehicles are concentrated, is located approximately ten kilometers from the mountain tank park says a lot. During a two-week period, Captain I. Biserov's subordinates took 10-12 vehicles out on exercises. They returned to the yard for dinner and at night. Thus they made four trips per day. Yet it would have been very possible to set up messing, fueling and equipment servicing right at the tank

training area. This would have required only a little good management and wit and would have significantly reduced expenditures.

Thus a lot of valuable time, motor transport reserves and material resources were expended and the result was no more than modest. And this is even more offensive in that we are discussing a training subunit whose many graduates must themselves teach people when they go out into units and must indoctrinate them with the spirit of a thrifty attitude toward national property.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

ON MODERNIZATION OF NATO TACTICAL AVIATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Krasnov, Candidate of Military Sciences, and engineer G. Silin: "Modernizing Tactical Aviation"]

[Text] As evidence by foreign press, refurbishing the tactical aviation fleet has a special place in the plans for re-equipping the Air Forces of the US and other NATO countries. As foreign military reviewers note, this desire was caused by the fact that at the present time it is impossible to conduct successful military ground force operations without active aviation support. In addition, tactical aviation has been entrusted with the missions of suppressing air defense means, carrying out radio-electronic operations and localizing battle areas by attacking stationary targets deep in the enemy's defense and also by engaging his reserves.

And hence the extensive sum-total of aircraft which are involved in tactical aviation. These include multi-purpose fighters, fighter-interceptors, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and aircraft for electronic countermeasures and air defense suppression.

In outlining the further development of this type of aircraft, foreign military experts suggest that such tactical flight-characteristic requirements as increasing operating ranges, improving maneuverability, and the capacity to carry a great amount of various types of aviation weapons, including guided missiles and aviation and cluster bombs, are of prime importance. It is felt that tactical aviation aircraft must have weapons with extended ranges (so that they can be employed without entering the enemy air defense envelope) and must carry out operational flights under extreme weather conditions.

Foreign press notes that the tactical aviation fleet is being refurbished by developing new designs and by modernizing those models already in the inventory. This is explained abroad by the fact that it takes a significant amount of time, on the order of 15-20 years, to develop a fundamentally new aircraft. Yet these winged vehicles become obsolescent at a much faster rate. Modernization uses the introduction of new technical solutions as a means for extending the time for effectively using existing aircraft.

As the magazine ARMY RESERVE notes, since 1981 the U.S. Department of Defense has been implementing "plan for improved variations." This is being done in several stages as the new equipment and weapons intended to be mounted on the aircraft become available.

The magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports that at the present time the US has begun to realize its multi-stage programs for modernizing F-15's and F-16's. For example, one stage calls for the following equipment to be mounted on the multi-purpose F-15C fighter: an AN/APG-63 RLS [radar communications line], a more improved central computer, an anti-radar warning system, the means for setting up active and passive radio jamming, and the equipment for combining the assessment of JTIDS tactical information and Navstar satellite navigational information.

One feature of the new RLS is that it is equipped with programmable signal processors. Foreign experts think that this allows the aircraft to automatically track several aerial targets. The improved angular reference resolution allows not only stationary targets, but also moving targets (with speeds in excess of five kilometers per hour) to be detected.

F-15C fighters destined for the Rapid Deployment Force are equipped with "Fast Pack" special supplemental fuel containers that have a 4500 kilogram total capacity. Experts think that this will allow them to cross the Atlantic without aerial refueling.

According to foreign experts, the use of shortened, low-drag pylons allows the airplane to increase its operating range and its low-altitude flight speed when flying with bomb loads.

Designers propose to further increase F-15 combat capabilities by mounting an integrated system for flight and weapons control and also by mounting a digital electronics system for controlling the power plant. Foreign press is reporting that the improved F-15C fighter is planned to be delivered to the forces at the end of this year.

The development and production of the F-15E model in a fighter-bomber variation is also planned.

Reviewers note that the multi-purpose F-16C that has been in the U.S. Air Force inventory since 1979 has a significant defect -- it can be employed only under relatively simple weather conditions. Designers are hoping to increase the aircraft's capability by improving on-board equipment such as the RLS, the central computer and the indicator systems.

More comprehensive F-16C modernization is planned for the next three years. This includes work on the power plant (a more powerful engine with digital control system will be used), on weapons (new guided missiles and the Lantirn pod-mounted, low-level infra-red sighting and navigational system are being added into the system) and on the flight control system (a new generation computer with preset support will be used). In addition, the cockpit will have two multifunction displays and a wide-coverage display on the front windscreen.

The magazine INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW tells us about work on modernizing the F-14 tactical fighter that is found in the Air Force inventories of the US, Great Britain, the FRG, Japan, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and South Korea. The total number of these aircraft exceeds 3500. Plans call for them to be armed with new guided missile systems which allow them to fire at numerous aerial targets at the same time. The thrust-to-weight ration of the aircraft has been increased by mounting more powerful engines and this has to have a positive effect on the its take-off and flight characteristics.

The operational range of the modernized tactical fighter version is suppose to increase through the use of a special non-expendable fuel tank that is mounted under the fuselage and that has a 4,160 liter capacity. This tank has less drag than the conventional drop tank. The cockpit light and the heavy elements in the airframe construction are also being modernized.

Foreign press reports that the F-111 (modifications A, E, F, and D) is also suppose to have a whole series of revisions. One of the primary ones is that the sighting and navigational system which has recently failed rather often in flight is to be replaced. Foreign experts see the addition of more reliable digital information processing equipment such as the new sighting RLS, terrain-relief radar, interdependency between the sighting and navigational systems and improved information displays as the solution to this problem.

There are specific reasons for modernizing A-10 ground attack aircraft. The first of these is to guarantee flight capability at very low altitudes, day and night, under poor weather conditions. A lot of attention is also being focused on increasing nagivational accuracy and increasing the range for detecting and identifying small targets on the battle field. At the same time, designers are searching for ways to reduce the load on the pilot by automating aircraft control. The INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW magazine notes that this will allow the pilot to concentrate his attention on controlling the aerial situation.

The magazine also reports that the airplane will be equipped with RLS in the millimeter range, a low-altitude infra-red sighting and navigational system, a television mount which facilitates operating at twilight and other equipment. To continue, this entire system allows the pilot to manually pilot by contour navigation at an altitude of 180 meters under difficult weather conditions and to employ guided missiles and aviation bombs with laser, television and thermal homing heads.

The program for modernizing tactical aviation aircraft is yet one more link in the overall chain of expanding U.S. and NATO Air Force military potential.

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